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"Ul/udges are fallible human beings. We need to see that biases and
prejudices and conditions of attention affect the judge's reasoning as
they do the reasoning of ordinary men . . . . The study of human
nature in law . . . may not only deepen our knowledge of legal
institutions but open an unworked mine ofjudicial wisdom."
-Jerome Frank, 1930'
"IM/an has a propensity to prejudice. This propensity lies in his nor-
mal and natural tendency to form generalizations, concepts, categories,
whose content represents an oversimplification of his world experience."
-Gordon Allport, 1954'
INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) once operated as a notice
pleading rule, requiring plaintiffs to set forth only a "short and plain"
statement of their claim. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,3 and then Ashcroft
v. Iqbal,' the United States Supreme Court recast Rule 8(a) into a plausi-
bility pleading standard. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter "to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face."5 Iqbal requires federal courts, when deciding whether a com-
plaint is plausible, to draw on their "judicial experience and common
sense."6 Courts apply this standard at the commencement of litigation,
evaluating the plausibility of claims before discovery-before evidence
has been gathered and presented. This highly subjective pleading standard
applies to all claims, including claims of discrimination by members of
stereotyped groups. In short, under Iqbal, federal courts must grapple at
the inception of litigation with deciding whether members of stereo-
typed groups have pleaded plausible claims of discrimination, relying on
their intuitions and common sense, rather than evidence.
The nature of this new pleading standard raises pressing and pro-
found questions about the psychology of judging: Might Iqbal rest on a
flawed theory of judgment and decision making? Can judges draw on
common sense, rather than evidence, to adjudicate claims of discrimina-
tion by members of stereotyped groups without the subtle effect of
implicit bias? This Article sheds light on these questions by drawing on
social psychological research. From findings in the field of social psychol-
1. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 145-46 (1930).
2. GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 27 (1954).
3. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
4. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
5. Id. at 1960 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
6. Id. at 1950.
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ogy, the Article first forms hypotheses and then conducts an empirical
legal study that closely examines how federal courts have adjudicated mo-
tions to dismiss Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination.
Over the past several decades, social psychologists have illuminated
natural processes that affect decision making and lead to bias. This science
suggests that when judges deliberate without evidence, relying instead on
their own "common sense," intuitions, stereotypes, and implicit associa-
tions will likely affect their judgment. The phenomenon of aversive
racism suggests that implicit bias will influence decision making, particu-
larly when judges decide ambiguous cases.' Furthermore, research on lay
theories of racism suggests that many judges subscribe to the folk theory
that racism is necessarily blatant and that discrimination is largely a prob-
lem of the past.8 Yet prejudice is still prevalent in society and has largely
evolved from overt to more subtle forms.
This social psychological research has not been brought to bear in
the spirited jurisprudential debate that Iqbal and Twombly have generated.
Some commentators maintain that neither Twombly nor Iqbal forge new
law under Rule 8(a): both merely make explicit how courts have decided
motions to dismiss all along.'o Others contend that it is too soon to tell
whether Iqbal has affected how courts decide motions to dismiss or
whether courts will increasingly dismiss civil rights claims." Most schol-
ars who criticize the Iqbal Court assert that Iqbal fashioned a new
procedural regime that will curb access to justice and the vindication of
civil rights.12
Whether Iqbal has led to a heightened pleading regime and what
Iqbal means for civil rights litigation, however, become clear only by em-
pirically examining the ways in which courts have interpreted and
applied Iqbal." In fact, a first wave of post-Iqbal empirical scholarship has
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Anericans'Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 194 (2009) (statement of Gregory G. Garre, Partner,
Latham & Watkins LLP); Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading With Congress to Resist the
Urge to Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MIcH. L. REv. 415, 427-37 (2010) (Part II,"Busi-
ness as Usual"); see also Kendall W Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly?:A Study on
the Inipact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1811,1835-38 (2008).
11. See David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117,146 (2010).
12. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to lqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules qf Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 20-23 (2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Changinr Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 517, 532-36 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, The
New Sunmaryjudgnment Motion: The Motion to Disniss Under lqbal and Twonbly, 14 LEWIS
& CIARK L. REV. 15, 34-38 (2010).
13. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoL-
um. L. REv. 809, 824 (1935) ("Fundamentally there are only two significant questions in
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revealed a broad trend in federal case law: courts are increasingly dismiss-
ing civil rights actions." Joining a second wave of scholarship that draws
on social science to test Iqbal's effect in narrow, particular contexts, this
Article focuses on the question of how Black plaintiffs who claim race
discrimination in the workplace have fared under Iqbal. This Article
demonstrates that Iqbal has had an even greater effect on these claims than
initial studies suggested.
This Article is part of an undertaking by jurists and legal scholars
who promote behavioral realism in the law" and naturalized jurispru-
dence.16 The undertaking identifies advances in social and cognitive
psychology that provide empirically supported models of human nature.
It then contrasts those empirically supported models with assumptions of
human nature embedded within the law. Often the science and assump-
tions about human nature collide. 7 As a research paradigm, behavioral
realism seeks to understand judicial behavior based on research and
the field of law. One is,'How do courts actually decide cases of a given kind?'The other
is,'How ought they to decide cases of a given kind?' Unless a legal 'problem' can be sub-
sumed under one of these forms, it is not a meaningful question and any answer to it must
be nonsense."); cf ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY FOR BE-
HAVIORAL SCIENCE 36 (Leonard Broom, ed., Chandler Publications 1964) ("We may call
this semantic empiricism. It is the view that to be meaningful at all a proposition must be
capable of being brought into relation with experience as a test of its truth. Its meaning,
indeed, can be construed only in terms ofjust such experiences as provide a test.").
14. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and lqbal Matter Em-
pirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 553 (2010); Hannon, supra note 10.
15. The concept of behavioral realism as used in this Article was introduced at a
July 2006 symposium discussing how advances in social and cognitive psychology lend
new perspective to jurisprudence under federal nondiscrimination laws and the Equal
Protection Clause. After the symposium, jurists and social and cognitive psychologists
produced several noteworthy articles: Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Te Law of Iniplicit
Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006); Linda H. Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrinination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REv. 997
(2006); Linda H. Krieger, Behavioral Realism in Liwi: Reframing the Discussion About Social
Science's Place in Antidiscrimination Law and Policy, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 383 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
16. See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 31 (2007) ("Naturalisns is a familiar de-
velopment in recent philosophy: indeed, it would not be wrong to say that it is the
distinctive development in philosophy over the last thirty years .... [T]raditional philo-
sophical problems are ... insoluble by the a priori, armchair methods of the philosopher,
and . . .require, instead, embedding in (or replacement by) suitable empirical theories.").
17. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON CAIRNs, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1935) ("The
development of the synthesis of law and psychology will be a long and perhaps a tedious
process; but it is a process, however much patience it may require, which for the law will
yield a fruitful harvest."); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit
Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REv. 465, 490 (2010); Victor D. Quintanilla, (Mis)Judzing
Intent: The Fundamental Attribution Error in Federal Securities Law, 7 N.YU. J.L. & Bus. 195,
197 (2010); see also Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
205, 311 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993).
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methods in the fields of social and cognitive psychology in combination
with the empirical study ofjudicial decisions.' 8
Plausibility pleading is an excellent window through which to ex-
amine whether social psychological phenomena are borne out in judicial
behavior.'9 Iqbal requires courts to draw on their "common sense" when
deciding whether claims are sufficiently plausible to withstand dismissal.
Implicit in this requirement is the assumption that judges are cold, deduc-
tive beings who can draw on common sense without the pull of
heuristics, implicit associations, and stereotypes. This Article tests whether
this assumption holds in practice. 0
Three studies were conducted to examine judicial decision-making
motions to dismiss Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination in the
workplace.2 A statistical analysis of 208 cases revealed that the folk psy-
chological underpinnings of Iqbal are unsound: implicit bias and lay
theories of discrimination appear to affect judicial decision making at the
pleading stage. The dismissal rate increased from 20.5% pre-Twombly to
54.6% post-Iqbal for Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination-a 2.66
times increase. For reasons discussed later, most of these claims would
have withstood dismissal before Twombly. For Black pro se plaintiffs'
claims, the dismissal rate increased from 32.0% before Twombly to 67.3%
under Iqbal, representing a 2.10 times increase. Finally, White and Black
judges apply Iqbal differently: White judges dismissed Black plaintiffs'
claims of race discrimination at a higher rate (57.5%) than did Black
judges (33.3%).
These substantial discrepancies were not inevitable. In developing
the federal common law of pleading, federal courts have leeway to
18. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew Wistrich, Inside the judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 778 (2001);Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and Gov-
ernance, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 567, 567-74
(Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2007) [hereinafter Rachlinski, Heuristics]; Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect TrialJudges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1195 (2009) [hereinafter Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?];
see also Howard Erlanger et al., Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 335,
337 (2005); Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realisni: "Things Ain't What
They Used to Be," 2005 Wis. L. REV. 365, 385-87 (2005); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sun-
stein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 831 (2008).
19. See, e.g.,Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Processing Pleadings and the Psychology of Prejudgment,
60 DEPAUL L. REv. 413, 414 (2011) ("The growing body of research ... suggests that the
new pleading standard ... will have some unfortunate consequences.").
20. Cf Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. U. L. RE. 12, 14-15
(1910) ("[There are] distinctions between law in the books and law in action ... today ...
the distinction between legal theory and judicial administration is often a very real and a
very deep one.").
21. See irfra Part IV
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exercise their judicial discretion2 and could have interpreted Iqbal (and can
still) to ensure continuity, coherence, and predictability with Rule 8(a)
and the Rules Enabling Act. The Rules Enabling Act requires federal
courts to adhere to existing procedural rules that have been subject to
notice and comment, approved through the formal rule making process
by the Judicial Conference and its committees, and ultimately authorized
by the Supreme Court and Congress. In the past, the Court twice es-
chewed heightened pleading standards for civil rights claims, rejecting the
suggestion that a heightened pleading bar could be imposed by judicial
interpretation. 25 The Iqbal Court did not expressly oppose these holdings,
and the Court in Twombly approved Swierkiewicz, which in fact held that a
heightened pleading bar shall not apply for claims of discrimination. 26 Yet
federal courts have interpreted Iqbal as if the lqbal Court required height-
ened pleading for claims of discrimination. Many courts have rigorously
interpreted Iqbal, and the dismissal rate for Black plaintiffs' claims of em-
ployment discrimination has climbed. That interpretation and
reconstruction of Iqbal violates the Rules Enabling Act. That interpreta-
tion must be traded for one consistent with Rule 8(a). Under a more
sound interpretation, the question is not whether race discrimination hap-
pened, but whether race discrimination could have happened in light of
21
the allegations. Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Skinner v.
Switzer applies this view.29 In that case, the Court reaffirmed the vitality of
Swierkiewicz and held that the critical question was not whether plaintiffs
will ultimately prevail on their claims, but whether plaintiffs' claims are
sufficient to cross the Rule 8(a) threshold.30
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I traces the history of federal
pleading standards through time, showing that evolving pleading rules
have often correlated with evolving societal attitudes about race and civil
rights in American society. Part II introduces the reader to social psycho-
logical research on aversive racism, implicit bias, lay theories of racism,
and the nature of contemporary prejudice, drawing hypotheses for how
22. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 70-71 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008)
(1930); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs 213-35
(1960).
23. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 5§ 2071-2077 (2006).
24. See 28 U.S.C. 5 2071(a)-(b); Paul Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rule-
rnaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597,648 (2010).
25. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Leatherman v. Tar-
rant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 163, 168-69 (1993).
26. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007).
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
28. See Starr v. Baca, No. 09-55233, 2011 WL 2988827, at *15 (9th Cir. July 25,
2011); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 E3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010); Boykin v. KeyCorp,
521 F3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008).
29. 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011).
30. Id.
6 [VOL. 17:1
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Iqbal may affect the behavior of federal courts. Part III offers a brief pri-
mer on federal employment discrimination law for those unfamiliar with
the jurisprudence. Part IV presents three empirical studies of lqbal's effect
on claims of race discrimination in the workplace. Part V discusses Iqbal's
effect on claims of race discrimination, exploring (1) how [qbal has shifted
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework from summary judgment to
the pleading stage and (2) how federal courts have reinterpreted elements
of the prima facie case. Part VI frames the problem, explores its epistemic
and practical consequences, and offers closing remarks and recommenda-
tions.
By bringing one problem into view-the increased dismissal rate
for Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination-this Article hopes to
encourage other scholars to investigate how Iqbal has affected claims of
discrimination brought by members of stereotyped groups. Further, many
of the social psychological and cognitive biases explored in this Article
likely occur beyond the civil rights context in other attitudinally charged
classes of claims." It is hoped that others will focus on the gap between
the unsound assumptions underpinning Iqbal and its actual application
across a variety of situations.
I.THE ROAD FROM NOTICE PLEADING TO
PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING UNDER IQBAL
The road from Conley to Iqbal-the expansion and then contraction
of pleading practice under the Federal Rules-has correlated with chang-
ing societal attitudes toward civil rights in American society.32 As the
federal pleading standard has shifted, so too have common-sense concep-
tions about race, prejudice, and discrimination over time (for better or for
worse), reflecting wide social and economic changes in American socie-
ty." As Justice Cardozo famously observed, "[t]he great tides and currents
31. See Lawrence Baum, Motivation and judicial Behavior: Expanding the Scope of the
Inquiry, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 3, 16-19 (David Klein &
Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
32. Others have written deftly about how the Court's new jurisprudence has im-
periled the enforcement of legal rights. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell,
Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IowA L. REV. 821, 840-47 (2010); Miller, supra note
12, at 111; Schneider, supra note 12, at 551; A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49
B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008); Thornas, supra note 12, at 18. Arthur Miller, Paul Carring-
ton, and others have discussed how the changing nature of private litigation, with its
increasing cost and complexity, has led special interests to curb access to the courts. E.g.
Carrington, supra note 24, at 655-56; Miller, supra note 12, at 14-15.
33. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA 37, 140-41 (2002);John Higham,
Coda: Three Reconstructions, in CIVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WRONGS: BLACK-WHITE RELA-
TIONS SINCE WORLD WAR 11 179, 179-89 (John Higharn ed., 1997); see also HENRI TAJFEL,
HuMAN GROUPS & SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN SoCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 223-27 (1981)
(discussing an alternative approach to the social psychology of intergroup relations).
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which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass
the judges by."34
A. Expansion-Notice Pleading and Conley
Code pleading, which required litigants to allege precisely the factu-
al bases for their claims, dominated the courts from the nineteenth until
the early twentieth century. Courts dismissed claims for technicalities
and for failing to plead required facts.Judges reviewed pleadings so strict-
ly that if alleged facts later varied in any way from evidence proffered at
trial, they dismissed suits to penalize variance with the pleadings.3 ' This
practice resulted in uncertainty, a complex maze of rules, and procedural
traps for unwary litigants.3 ' By the late nineteenth century, many consid-
ered the law of pleading too inflexible and rigid.
During the code pleading years, state-imposed inequality rather
than any kind of access to courts was a fact of life for Blacks. In Dred Scott
v. Sandford, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the framers re-
garded Blacks as "a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who ... had
no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the
Government might choose to give them." After the Civil War, many
Blacks lived in a South that stripped them of legal and political rights.4 "
Racism peaked in the period between the end of Reconstruction and
World War I, an era of terror that has been called the "nadir" of the Afri-
can American experience.4 1 Blacks were considered the intellectual and
34. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 168 (1921).
35. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARiz. L. REv. 987,
990 (2003); see also CHARLES E. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 22 (2d ed. 1947); Charles E. Clark,
Simplified Pleading, in 2 ER.D. 456,458-60 (1943) [hereinafter Clark, Simplified Pleading].
36. See RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC
COURSE 502-507, 520-21 (7th ed. 1997); BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-
LAW PLEADING 515-16 (3d ed. 1923); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5 1202 (3d ed. 2004).
37. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 574 (2007) (Stevens J., dissenting);
FIELD ET AL., supra note 36, at 512-13; Roscoe Pound, The Etiquette ofJustice, in 3 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 231, 237-48 (1906-1909); Stephen N.
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 940 (1987); see also
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 36, at § 1216; Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in
Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 417 (1921).
38. See Clark, Simplified Pleading, supra note 35, at 456-57.
39. 60 U.S. 393, 417 (1856).
40. See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 81-111 (2002) (dis-
cussing the fact that prejudice was not the sole province of the South as, in the North also,
many drew on Social Darwinism to justify racism).
41. Id. at 81 (citing RAYFORDW LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO: FROM RUTH-
ERFORD B. HAYES TO WOODROW WILSON (1965)).
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moral inferior of Whites, 2 and the education of Blacks was legally for-
bidden. In the notorious case of Plessy v. Ferguson,4 the Supreme Court
approved the separate-but-equal doctrine and affirmed Jim Crow segre-
gation.45
In 1938, in the wake of the New Deal, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were enacted. Rejecting the code-based system, the drafters
modernized federal practice and rejected technical forms of pleading, re-
quiring courts to construe pleadings liberally.4 6 Rule 8 was designed to
discourage battles over form in order to provide substantial justice and
access to courts . Breaking from the codes of the past, notice pleading
allowed claims to be framed in general terms: under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2), a federal complaint need only provide "a short and
plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief."
After the New Deal and World War II, many Whites-especially in
the North-began to view the Blacks' plight with sympathy, ushering in
the beginnings of improved race relations.' At the same time, the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
42. See JAMES WVANDER ZANPEN, AMERICAN MINORITY RELATIONS 46 (2d ed. 1966)
("During the first two decades of the twentieth century, authorities [using Alfred Binet's
intelligence tests] tended to conclude that Negroes were the intellectual inferiors of
[W]hites.").
43. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954) ("[Any education of Negroes
was forbidden in some states.").
44. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
45. Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy was prophetic: "In my opinion, the judgment
this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by
this tribunal in the Dred Scott case." 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan,J. dissenting).
46. See Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1938-1958, 58 COLUM.
L. REv. 435, 447-52 (1958) [hereinafter Clark, The Federal Rules]; Charles E. Clark, The
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase-Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some
qf the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977 (1937) [hereinafter Clark,
The New Federal Rules]; Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLum. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986); Miller, supra note 12, at 41; A.
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REv. 431,434 (2008).
47. Clark, Simplified Pleading, supra note 35, at 458-60; Clark, The New Federal Rules,
supra note 46, at 977.
48. Many people began to view segregation as morally wrong. See FREDRICKSON,
supra note 40, at 129 ("Within the United States, there was a growing realization among
those concerned with international relations that Jim Crow not only was analogous to
Nazi treatment of the Jews and thus morally indefensible but was also contrary to the
national interest."). Moreover, World War II necessitated a breakdown of class, regional,
and race lines as all hands were called to deck. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 239
(1977) ("Class and regional barriers were being breached everywhere, and in the building
and supplying of the most massive and lethal war machine the world had ever seen, the
Negro had demonstrated ... that he could amount to a great deal more than the [W]hite
man's burden ifAmerica would give him half the chance.").
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adopted a strategy to dismantle segregation through the courts." The
NAACP sought to overrule Plessy and the separate-but-equal doctrine.so
Cases such as Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada," Sweatt v. Painter,5 and
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents53 reflect the NAACP's gains toward
that end. In time, however, a growing community began criticizing the
liberal ethos of Rule 8." Federal courts began to impose heightened
pleading standards in large commercial cases, such as antitrust disputes.
Charles Clark, Chief Judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and
the principal drafter of the Federal Rules, characterized this retrenchment
as a revolt against the Rules." By the early 1950s, this movement gained
so much traction that the Ninth Circuit proposed that Rule 8(a) be re-
drafted to require plaintiffs to allege "the facts constituting a cause of
action."" The Advisory Committee ultimately defeated this proposal.
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Warren Court overturned Plessy
and held that "in the field of public education the doctrine of'separate
but equal' has no place.",8 In writing that segregation signaled the belief
that Blacks were inferior, Justice Warren drew on scientific research show-
ing that segregation subjected Blacks to stigma, with a detrimental
psychological effect. 9 Brown reflected a paradigm shift in American socie-
ty: for the first time, real equality for Blacks was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court. After Brown, the NAACP defeated segregation in
other areas of public life, including public transportation, public recrea-
tion, restaurants, hotels, and the railways."
49. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, at 37.
50. Nathan Maragold, a prot6g6 of Felix Frankfurter, authored a report for the
NAACP that proposed a series of lawsuits "boldly challeng[ing] the constitutional validi-
ty" of underfunded Black schools as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. KLUGER,
supra note 48, at 133-35.
51. 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (providing in-state legal education to Whites but not
Blacks violates equal protection).
52. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (new Texas law school for Blacks not substantially equal
education to University ofTexas Law School).
53. 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (requiring Black doctoral student to sit apart from White
colleagues violates equal protection).
54. See Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in die "Big Case," 21 ER.D. 45, 49 (1957);
Marcus, supra note 46, at 445.
55. See Clark, supra note 54, at 49; Marcus, supra note 46, at 445.
56. See Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on tie Need for Amendment of Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 FR.D. 253, 253 (1952).
57. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS 18-19 (1955).
58. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
59. Id. at 494.
60. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (invalidating segrega-
tion in public parks, playgrounds, and other recreational facilities); Turner v. City of
Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (invalidating segregation in all publicly operated facilities);
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The Warren Court reaffirmed the liberal ethos of Rule 8 in Conley
v. Gibson, a case filed by Black railway workers claiming that their union
failed to represent them because of race discrimination.6' The union filed
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that the complaint
failed to set forth specific facts to support a claim of discrimination. The
Court held that a federal complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to re-
lief."62 Plaintiffs' broad allegations of discrimination withstood dismissal.
For years after Conley, federal courts accepted as true all factual allegations
contained in the complaint and, in ruling on motions to dismiss, drew all
reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs."
In the economic expansion of the 1950s and early 1960s, the War-
ren Court increased access to justice. During this era, Southern courts
regularly and blatantly deprived Blacks of procedural protections granted
by the Bill of Rights and incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. In response, the Supreme Court expanded ha-
beas corpus jurisdiction for criminal defendants who sought federal
review of their state court convictions. In Fay v. Noia, the Court held that
even where defendants had not complied with a state procedural rule,
they would not necessarily be denied access to federal courts in order to
press their habeas claims.6 4
By the 1960s, after the Civil Rights movement and post-World War
II, many believed that racism was wrong. Congress enacted the Civil
Boynton v.Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (invalidating segregation in bus terminals). Back-
lash spurred by the progress of Blacks in courts resulted in the mobilization of White
Citizens Councils in the South, which fought desegregation and perpetuated the view
that Blacks were inferior and interracial mixing was unnatural. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PART-
ING THE WATERS 138 (1988); VANDER ZANDEN, AMERICAN MINORITY RELATIONS, supra note
42, at 53-54.
61. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).The plaintiffs alleged that they had been "discharged wrong-
fully by the Railroad and that the Union, acting according to plan, refused to protect their
jobs as it did those of [W]hite employees or to help them with their grievances all because
they were Negroes." Id. at 46.
62. Id. at 45-46.The Court later added,
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out
in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.... [A]ll the Rules require
is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
Id. at 47 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)( 2 )).
63. Motions to dismiss were looked upon with disfavor and thus rarely granted. See
DAVID F. HERR, ROGERS S. HAYDOCK & JEFFREY W STEMPEL, MOTION PRACTICE § 9.06[B]
(4th ed. 2005).
64. 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963).
65. See Sterling Stuckey, Racisni, in THE OxFon COMPANION TO UNITED STATES
HISTORY 644, 645 (Paul S. Boyer ed., 2001);J. Garry Clifford, World War If: Postwar Impact,
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Rights Act of 1964 to outlaw discrimination in employment, education,
and public accommodation and to broaden access to justice for minori-
ties.6 6 In Loving v. Virginia, the Warren Court struck down a Virginia
statute that criminalized interracial marriages.
As the growth following World War II contracted in the late 1960s
and 19 70s, many Americans began to feel economic malaise." For many,
ambivalence replaced optimism about race relations. Many began to be-
lieve that Blacks had come far enough. Given widespread negative
attitudes toward further integration and policies such as busing, America
witnessed the phenomenon ofWhite flight to suburbs.69 In reviewing the
Nixon Administration's enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, the U.S.
Civil Rights Commission reported, "Present programs often are adminis-
tered so as to continue rather than reduce racial segregation."
In the 1960s and 1970s, federal courts witnessed a dramatic rise in
court filings, which some characterized as a "litigation boom."" Some
scholars and practitioners called for retrenchment of Rule 8 and for
heightened pleading bars, 2 and soon federal courts listened. Courts re-
vived fact pleading in numerous quarters, including securities fraud,
antitrust, and civil rights litigation."
Eventually, the cases litigating these heightened pleading standards
wended their way to the Supreme Court. Twice the Court held that the
only proper way to fashion a heightened pleading standard is through the
in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO UNITED STATES HISTORY 849, 850 (Paul S. Boyer ed.,
2001).
66. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); DANIEL M. BERMAN, A BILL BECOMES A LAW:
CONGRESS ENACTS CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION (2d ed. 1966); NICK KOTZ,JUDGMENT DAYs:
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., AND THE LAWS THAT CHANGED AMER-
ICA (2005); ROBERT D. LOEVY, To END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1990).
67. 388 U.S.1 (1967).
68. See generally, BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING: THE INNER LIFE OF THE
MIDDLE CLASS (1989).
69. See KLUGER, supra note 48, at 765-78.
70. Id. at 764 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. See Marcus, supra note 46, at 445.
72. See id. at 445-47; Claim or Cause ofAction, supra note 56, at 253.
73. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Trussell, 347 F2d 86, 90 (2d CiF. 1965); FIELD ET AL., supra
note 36, at 524; Marcus, supra note 46, at 445-50. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal
of a Black physician's race discrimination claim against his employer and union, character-
izing notice pleading as merely the general rule and finding that his allegations conclusory
and his termination most likely the result of workplace friction. Id. at 90. See also Rotolo
v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) (In reaction to the "increasingly
large volume of cases brought under the Civil Rights Act," a "substantial number" of
which were "frivolous or should be litigated in the State courts," the Third Circuit em-
phasized the "important public policy" of "weed[ing] out the frivolous and insubstantial
cases at an early stage in the litigation" while permitting meritorious claims to go for-
ward).
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formal rule-making process envisioned by the Rules Enabling Act.7 4 In
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, the
Court rejected a heightened pleading bar in a civil rights case, finding it
"impossible to square" with the "liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up
by the Federal Rules." The Court reaffirmed Conley's holding that "all
the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will
give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
,,76grounds upon which it rests. It clarified that enacting a heightened
pleading bar would require rewriting Rule 8 or Rule 97 through the
formal process for amending the Federal Rules. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,
the Court again held that judicially fashioned heightened pleading stand-
ards violate the Rules Enabling Act.7 9
The Rules Enabling Act codifies a formal rule-making process for
rules of practice and procedure, including the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.o Under this process, proposed amendments are to be drafted and
reviewed by the Judicial Conference and its committees, and the public
must be provided notice and an opportunity to comment on proposed
changes."' After the Judicial Conference agrees to amend the rules, the
Supreme Court and Congress must approve any recommendations. The
Rules Enabling Act precludes federal courts from altering the federal
rules by judicial interpretation.82
B. Retrenchment-Plausibility Pleading Under Twombly and Iqbal
In the 1980s and 1990s, the liberal ethos of Rule 8 faded further.
Access was first restricted by legislation." In 1995, Congress enacted the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, altering the structure of private
securities class actions." One year later, Congress passed the Antiterrorism
74. See discussion supra pp. 10-11.
75. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligency & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163,168 (1993).
76. Id. at 168 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
77. Rule 9 applies to specific claims, providing: "a party rnust state with particulari-
ty the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge and other
conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." Fed. R. Civ. P 9(b).
78. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69.
79. 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002).
80. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2006); Carrington, supra note
24, at 648.
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b).
82. See 28 U.S.C. 5 2071(c)(2); Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515; Swint v. Chambers
Cnty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35,48 (1994); Leadernan, 507 U.S. at 168.
83. See Miller, supra note 12, at 11 n.35.
84. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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and Effective Death Penalty Act to restrict the availability of habeas cor-
pus relief.8
Many Americans endorsed the view that prejudice is morally
wrong, while simultaneously resisting measures to equalize opportunity
for people of color.16 Several Supreme Court rulings reflect this view. In
Missouri v. Jenkins, for example, the Supreme Court held that district
courts may not remedy inter-school district segregation by creating mag-
net programs to attract nonminority students from outside the school
district back into inner-city schools." With a bit of finesse, the Court
deemed the ordered improvement, aiming to attract nonninority stu-
dents living in other school districts, to be a forbidden "interdistrict
remedy" because there had been no interdistrict violation. En route, the
Supreme Court advised federal courts to bear in mind that Brown's pur-
pose is not "only to remedy the violation to the extent practicable, but
also to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system
that is operating in compliance with the Constitution." Jenkins repre-
sented a retrenchment of Brown and subsequent desegregation cases:
rather than exhorting school districts to eliminate all vestiges of segrega-
tion "root and branch,"" the Court blocked the efforts of a district court
to attract nonminority students back into inner-city schools.9'
Ultimately, calls for litigation reform and, more specifically, to curb
complex commercial litigation prompted the Supreme Court to recast
Rule 8(a). In Twombly, consumers brought an antitrust action against ma-
jor telephone monopolies under section 1 of the Sherman Act.92 The
plaintiffs alleged that these companies had conspired to restrain trade by
engaging in parallel conduct: by simultaneously refusing to compete
among themselves and inhibiting the upstart of potential new rivals.9 3 Af-
ter the district court granted dismissal on the grounds that "conscious
parallelism" fails to state a claim under the Sherman Act, the Second Cir-
85. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
86. See MicA POLLOCK, BECAUSE OF RACE: How AMERICANs DEBATE HARM AND
OPPORTUNITY IN OUR SCHOOLs 175 (2008).
87. 515 U.S. 70,89-102 (1995).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 102.
90. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
91. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 168-69 (SouterJ., dissenting); see GARY ORFIELD, SusAN E.
EATON & THE HARVARD PROJECT ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, DISMANTLING DESEGREGA-
TION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, at xix (1996) ("Today,
Broum's vision is being abandoned .... [Plolitical and legal forces have converged to dis-
mantle one of our greatest constitutional victories.").
92. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-54 (2007).
93. Id. at 550-51.
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cuit reversed, concluding that no "plus factor" was required beyond the
allegation of parallel conduct."
The Supreme Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim.]
Drawing on substantive antitrust law, the Court concluded that parallel-
ism was insufficient to create an inference of collusion; instead, allegations
must suggest that companies agreed to collude. The Court found that, at
the pleading stage, allegations must plausibly suggest an agreement: the
"plain statement" of Rule 8(a)(2) requires pleadings to possess enough
heft to show that plaintiffs are entitled to relief.97 The Court then retired
Conley, explaining that Conley's "no set of facts" language had been ex-
plained away long enough; the phrase "should be best forgotten as an
incomplete negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard."" Justice
Souter wrote that Twombly did not require heightened fact pleading, but
simply "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.""
In dissent, Justice Stevens rebuked the majority's reinterpretation of
Rule 8(a). He offered a eulogy for Conley and cited the Court's many
opinions that did not question, explain away, or criticize Conley's "no set
of facts" language.'" Justice Stevens discerned that Twombly might not be
cabined to antitrust actions,1 0' a question that was subsequently debated
by the legal community.1 02 The Federal Judicial Center and Advisory
Committee agreed to research Twombly's effect.'o3
As Justice Stevens had lamented, the Court extended Twombly to all
federal actions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.o' Iqbal, a Muslim citizen of Pakistan,
was arrested after 9/11, deemed of "high interest" to the FBI, and held in
a maximum-security prison. os He sued federal officials-including for-
mer Attorney General John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller, Director of the
FBI-claiming that they had adopted an unconstitutional policy that
94. Id. at 553.
95. Id. at 564.
96. Id. at 557.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 562-63.
99. Id. at 570. Ultimately, the Court concluded that plaintiffs had not "nudged their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Id.
100. Id. at 577-78 (Stevensj., dissenting).
101. Id. at 596-97; accord Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation
of Court Access, 94 IowA L. REv. 873, 881 (noting that federal courts appear to be "in favor
of a more general application" of Tivombly) (2009); Carrington, supra note 24, at 655-56.
102. See, e.g., Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We "Notice" Pleading
Changes?, 82 ST.JOHN's L. RE. 893,910-18 (2008).
103. Nathan Sellers, Note, Defending the Formal Federal Civil Rulemaking Process: Why
the Court Should Not Amend Procedural Rules Through judicial Interpretation, 42 Loy. U. Cm.
L.J. 327, 357-58 (2011).
104. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
105. Id. at 1943.
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subjected him to harsh confinement because of his race, religion, or na-
tional origin.0 6 These defendants moved to dismiss Iqbal's claim on the
ground of qualified immunity, which became the only issue before the
Court: whether Iqbal had pleaded enough facts to state a claim that these
high-level officials had adopted policies not for a neutral, investigative
reason, but instead for the purpose of discriminating on account of race,
religion, or national origin.0 7
In its opinion, the Court described a formula0 "' that many courts
now use to evaluate pleadings.'" First, courts identify and disregard state-
ments that are not entitled to the assumption of truth: legal conclusions
instead of factual allegations. If well-pled allegations remain, courts then
determine whether the complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face."0 Gauging plausibility is a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its "judicial experience and common
sense.
The Supreme Court then applied this formula. The Court first
characterized a number of lqbal's allegations as conclusory, including his
statements that Ashcroft and Muller knew of, condoned, and willfully
subjected him to harsh conditions because of his religion and race, which
constituted discrimination.11 2 The majority then concluded that Iqbal's
remaining allegations had not "'nudged [his] claims' of invidious discrim-
ination 'across the line from conceivable to plausible.' ""' In dissent,
Justice Souter (the author of Twonibly) criticized the majority for misap-
plying the decision. He attacked the majority for refusing to read Iqbal's
statements in context and for deeming many of Iqbal's allegations to be
legal conclusions."'
In sum, federal pleading practice first expanded from code pleading
to a notice-based system under Conley.The liberal ethos of Conley varied
with the Supreme Court's belief that federal courts must actively disarm
and dismantle segregation. As people's attitudes about race relations in
American society began shifting from optimism to ambivalence, the liber-
al ethos of the rules began to wane as well, with both trends paralleling
106. Id. at 1944.
107. Id. at 1942; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (recognizing a private action for damages against federal officials who violate con-
stitutional rights).
108. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51.
109. See, e.g., Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F3d 186, 193-94 (4th Cir. 2009).
110. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51. According to the Court,"[tihe plausibility standard
is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007)).
111. Id. at 1950.
112. Id. at 1951.
113. Id. (quoting Tivoibly, 550 U.S. at 570).
114. Id. at 1958-61 (SouterJ., dissenting).
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broad change in American society. Large commercial cases and civil rights
cases were increasingly viewed as vexatious. Although the Supreme Court
blocked prior attempts to create heightened pleading bars, its rulings in
Tivombly and Iqbal have led lower courts to interpret Iqbal as if a height-
ened pleading bar has been established. These courts have reconstituted
lqbal into a heightened pleading bar for civil rights cases without pro-
ceeding through the formal process envisioned by the Rules Enabling
Act. The Judicial Conference, the Advisory Committee, and the Federal
Judicial Center have not been granted a full opportunity to draw on their
collective experience to discuss how a heightened bar may adversely af-
fect claims of discrimination by members of stereotyped groups.1
tl. CONTEMPORARY RACIAL BIAS AND OTHER
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
Having presented a brief history of pleading standards, this Article
moves next to an introduction of social psychological research on con-
temporary racial bias. While blatant racism has waned, prejudice still
persists. In the past fifty years, the manifestation of prejudice has grown
more subtle.' In comparing surveys conducted in the 1940s and today,
majority group members express less hostile racial attitudes toward mi-
nority group members,"" and the percentage of Whites who denounce
racist views and endorse racial equality has risen."9 Overt prejudice to-
ward minority group members is no longer publicly acceptable.12
Notwithstanding these survey trends, the field of social psychology
has shown a continuing divide between words and deeds toward people
of color. Many Americans are not free of prejudice and struggle with
115. See Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009).
116. Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF
SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter Fiske,
Stereotyping] ("On the cusp of the twenty-first century, stereotyping, prejudice, and dis-
crirnination have not abated.").
117. See id. at 360 ("[Social psychologists] proposed that most [W]hites endorse
egalitarian values, but that American culture and their own cognitive biases nonetheless
result in antipathy toward [B]lacks and other minorities."); see also John F Dovidio &
Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 2
(2004) [hereinafter Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism].
118. See HowARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND IN-
TERPRETATIONS 103-21 (1997).
119. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions:
1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. Sci. 315 (2000) [hereinafter Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive
Racism and Selection Decisions].
120. See DALE T. MILLER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: EXPRESSING AND CENSORING THE SELF
89-106 (2006).
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their anti-Black attitudes.121 A duality persists between explicitly endorsed
122
attitudes and behavior toward members of minority groups. Contem-
porary forms of bias affect the lives of stereotyped groups in significant
ways.123 "Like a virus that has mutated, racism has evolved into different
forms that are more difficult not only to recognize but also to combat." 24
Since contemporary bias is less conscious and more subtle than overt, it is
expressed in indirect, often unintentional ways. Rather than antipathy,
many now show ambivalence and avoid members of stereotyped
groups.' Many majority group members exhibit anxiety, disgust, fear,
and discomfort toward stigmatized individuals, resulting in decreased
helping behavior and cooperation, passive harm, and neglect.126 In con-
trast, many exhibit liking and trust toward in-group members, resulting in
facilitation and cooperation with other majority group members.127 The
consequences are pernicious: the economic, health, and educational dis-
advantages of minority groups stem, in part, from contemporary bias.12 8
Social psychologists study intergroup bias as an attitude with three
components.129 First, prejudice refers to the affective or emotional com-
ponent, representing both the type of emotion linked with the attitude
and the extremity of that attitude. Second, stereotypes refer to the cogni-
tive component, the beliefs or thoughts (cognitions) that make up the
attitude. Finally, discrimination refers to the behavioral component, that
is, actions toward others.'" While stereotypes can be explicit, operating in
121. See Fiske, Stereotypinq, supra note 116, at 359-60; Susan T. Fiske, Social Conition
and the Normality of Prejudgment, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE: FIFTY YEARS AFTER ALL-
PORT 36, 38-40 (John F Dovidio et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Fiske, Social Cognition].
122. See Jennifer Crocker et al., Social Stiqma, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 504, 513-16 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); Dovidio & Gaertner,
Aversive Racism, supra note 117, at 7-10.
123. See Crocker et al., supra note 122, at 516-21.
124. John F Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J.
Soc. ISSUES 829, 837 (2001) (quoting John F Dovidio & Sam L. Gaertner, On the Nature of
Contemporary Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in CON-
FRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 2, 25 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan
T. Fiske eds., 1998)).
125. See Crocker et al., supra note 122, at 512-13.
126. See, e.g., Marilynn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in 2 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 554, 575 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998);
Crocker et al., supra note 122, at 512-16; Amy J.C. Cuddy & Susan T. Fiske, The BIAS
Map: Belaviors from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 631,
633-35 (2007).
127. See Crocker et al., supra note 122, at 516-17; Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Rac-
ism, supra note 117, at 3.
128. See Rebecca M. Blank, An Overview of Trends in Social and Economic Well-Being, by
Race, in AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 21-39 (Niel J.
Smelser et al. eds., 2001); Crocker et al., supra note 122, at 516-17.
129. See ELLIOT ARONSON Er AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 391 (7th ed. 2010).
130. See Fiske, Stereotyping, supra note 116, at 357.
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conscious awareness, prejudiced attitudes are often automatically activat-
ed. '3
Bias results, in part, from social categorization. Categorization is
normal, involuntary, and pervasive:132 we routinely and inadvertently cate-
gorize other people. '3 Given the troubled social, cultural, and historical
context of race relations in the United States, racial categorization is vir-
tually inescapable.13 The problem is that race increases the accessibility of
stereotypic associations. People naturally differentiate others by race,
and affect and attitudes relate closely to categories based on race. In other
words, bias stems not from psychopathology, but from natural psychologi-
cal processes.3 6
The field of social psychology has studied these processes from mul-
tiple points of view. Social psychologists have researched the perspectives
of majority group members and studied the psychological processes that
result in discrimination. Researchers have also studied the perspectives of
those who must interpret and draw inferences about whether discrimina-
tion occurred.
A. Aversive Racism
Aversive racism refers to racial bias among people who openly en-
dorse nonprejudiced beliefs, but whose negative implicit attitudes toward
Blacks are expressed in subtle, indirect, and rationalizable ways.'1 Such
racism is presumed to characterize the racial attitudes of most
131. See Dovidio, supra note 124, at 838; Fiske, Stereotyping, supra note 116, at 357.
132. See GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 20-27 (1954); Social Cognition,
supra note 121, at 38-39; SusanT. Fiske, What We Know Now About Bias and Intergroup Con-
flict, the Problem of the Century, 11 CuRREmr DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 123 (2002)
[hereinafter Fiske, What We Know About Bias].
133. See Social Cognition, supra note 121, at 38-39.
134. ALLPORT, supra note 132, at 27 ("[M]an has a propensity to prejudice. This pro-
pensity lies in his normal and natural tendency to form generalizations, concepts,
categories, whose content represents an oversimplification of his world experience."); see
also Social Cognition, supra note 121, at 38-39; Fiske, Stereotyping, supra note 116, at 364-67.
135. See Fiske, What We Know About Bias,supra note 132, at 124.
136. Cf Dovidio, supra note 124, at 830 ("[P]rejudice and racism are embedded in
people's group identities and in a society's institutions and its culture.").
137. Claude Steele and colleagues have also researched the target's perspective (the
stigmatized group member) when investigating the phenomena of stereotype threat. See
Claude Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of Afri-
can Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995). 1 leave the immense legal
significance of stereotype threat and situational cues for another day See Mary C. Murphy,
Claude M. Steele, & James J. Gross, Signaling Threat: How Situational Cues Afect Women in
Math, Science, and EngineerinR Studies, 18 PYSHCOL. Sci. 879 (2007).
138. See SAMuEiu L. GAERTNER & JOHN E DOVIDIO, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL 13-31 (2000); Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism,
supra note 117, at 7; Fiske, Stereotyping, supra note 116, at 359-60.
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well-educated Whites in the United States.' 39 Aversive racists aspire to be
nonprejudiced: they do not discriminate in situations with strong norms
against bias when discrimination would be obvious to others and
themselves. 4 0 In these situations, they are "especially motivated to avoid
feelings, beliefs, and behaviors that could be associated with" bias."' When
the correct choice is clear, aversive racists do not discriminate against
Blacks.2"'
Yet because aversive racists hold negative associations (such as
Black=Bad, Black=Criminal, Black=Untrustworthy) and feelings of un-
easiness toward Blacks, bias is expressed in subtle, indirect, and
rationalizable ways. Bias happens when the correct choice is unclear and
the basis for judgment is ambiguous: when one can rationalize a negative
behavior against Blacks on some other factor besides race.1 13 In these situ-
ations, despite their best intentions, aversive racists may unintentionally
harm Blacks. They may express their discomfort with Blacks by express-
ing in-group favoritism, withholding cooperation from or otherwise
excluding Blacks, or evaluating Whites more favorably than Blacks."'
To understand this behavior, one must understand the power of
context and situations. Since the manifestation of bias is sensitive to
norms in the immediate social context,145 the situation influences wheth-
er bias results in harmful behavior and discrimination. When the situation
is clear, people behave in unbiased ways; when it is ambiguous, people
often behave in ways that harm minorities. Scores of experiments have
documented aversive racism.146 Social psychologists have observed this
phenomenon across numerous contexts, including when majority group
members withhold helping behavior from Blacks, in emergency interven-
tions, resources allocation decisions, employment selection decisions, and
even decision making by mock juries.1
The theoretical framework for the empirical studies in this Article
are drawn, in particular, from seminal experiments that Dr. John E
Dovidio and his colleagues conducted on aversive racism in employment
139. See Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions, supra note 119, at
315.
140. See Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 117, at 4-7; Dovidio &
Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions, supra note 119, at 315.
141. Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 117, at 7.
142. Id. at 7-9.
143. See id. at 7-16.
144. See, e.g., Brewer & Brown, supra note 126, at 560-61; Crocker et al., supra note
122, at 512-16; Cuddy & Fiske, supra note 126, at 633-35.
145. See Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 117, at 7; Dovidio, supra
note 124, at 830.
146. See, e.g., Christopher L. Aberson & Tara E. Ettlin, The Aversive Racism Paradigm
and Responses: Meta-Analytic Evidence of Two Types of Favoritism, 17 Soc. JUST. REs. 26
(2004); Dovidio, supra note 124.
147. See Aberson & Ettlin, supra note 146; Dovidio, supra note 124.
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selection decisions."' Dovidio and colleagues investigated aversive racism
by exploring changes, over a ten-year period, in explicit racial attitudes
vis-a-vis hiring recommendations for Black or White candidates. The
study tested the hypothesis that although explicit racial attitudes would
decline over time, the hiring recommendations for Black candidates with
ambiguous job profiles would lag in comparison to similar White candi-
dates. The aversive racism framework correctly predicted the results.
While explicit racial attitudes softened over time, and participants favored
clearly qualified candidates over clearly unqualified candidates regardless
of race, the study revealed that participants recommended Whites who
were ambiguously qualified over Blacks who were ambiguously qualified,
at a significantly higher rate.
Aversive racism also leads to bias because of the "ultimate attribu-
tion error:""' the tendency to attribute failures and negative outcomes of
stereotyped individuals to their dispositional characteristics (personality
traits), rather than to situational influences (e.g., he failed the test because
he's not smart).o Yet those same failures by majority group members are
often attributed to situational factors, rather than to character flaws (e.g.,
he failed the test because he was up too late studying). The same error is
true for successful outcomes: many tend to attribute success by majority
group members to character traits and the success of stereotyped individ-
uals to situational factors (e.g., he passed the test because he is smart
versus because he got lucky).This attributional error-giving the benefit
of the doubt to majority members in a way not extended to stereotyped
individuals-tends to justify in-group favoritism and more favorable out-
comes for majority group members."'
Social psychologists have also examined how people rationalize
their decision making after they are forced to make choices in ambiguous
situations. 152 Subjects are not presented with objective criteria; decisions
must rely on subjective measures, which are necessarily elastic and allow
for rationalization of biased decisions after the fact. For example, when
people must select between male and female job candidates for stereo-
typically male jobs, most tend to automatically select males for the job. In
hindsight, people rationalize this preference by shifting the standard for
148. See Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions, supra note 119, at
315.
149. Thomas E Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allports Cognitive
Analysis of Prejudice, 5 PERSONALITY Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 461, 464 (1979). This error is
similar to the Fundamental Attribution Error, but more pernicious in that the error une-
venly affects merbers of stigmatized groups based on stereotypes. See id.; Quintanilla,
supra note 17, at 221-25.
150. See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 129, at 407.
151. See Crocker et al., supra note 122, at 512-16.
152. See Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PsycHOL. 817 (2004).
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decision making: they will inflate the importance of the criterion that
permits their preferred choice to dominate. Although gender and race
subtly affect decision making, people rarely acknowledge this influence.
Rationalization allows people to mask bias from others and themselves,
which allows them to avoid the cognitive dissonance that results from
biased decision making.1'
The depth and breadth of these psychological phenomena have
been shown using multiple techniques and methodologies. Social and
cognitive psychologists have deployed increasingly sophisticated technol-
ogies to study these biases. Beginning in the mid-1990s, scientists began
using a battery of techniques to measure intrinsic attitudes against
Blacks.' Researchers used measures such as the well-known Implicit As-
sociation Test (IAT). The IAT is a response latency procedure, which
shows that there is a greater association between Blacks and negative atti-
tudes than between Blacks and positive attitudes (Black=Bad versus
Black=Good).'" Social psychologists have also examined implicit associa-
tions by deploying physiological methods, such as facial electromyography
(EMG), galvanic skin response, and cardiovascular reactivity.' Finally, sci-
entists have examined amygdala brain activation. Using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) procedures, social psychologists have
examined the neuropsychological underpinnings of these processes.5
In sum, the field of social psychology has demonstrated the auto-
matic character of the stereotyping and implicit associations that result in
153. People are motivated to view themselves as impartial and unbiased; therefore,
when one perceives that a social category characteristic (e.g., race or gender) has affected
a decision, this threatens one's self concept.This dissonance results in the post hoc desire
to justify a decision in socially acceptable terms. See id. Interestingly, while many adults
thus exhibit a mismatch between their implicit associations about Blacks and their explicit
attitudes in favor of racial equality, kindergarteners have no such inconsistency. See
Frances Aboud, The Developmient of Prejudice in Childhood and Adolescence, in ON THE NA-
TURE OF PREJUDICE: FIFTY YEARs ArER ALLPORT 310, 315 (John E Dovidio et al. eds.,
2005); Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Development of Iniplicit Attitudes:
Evidence of Race Evaluations from Ages 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 53, 56
(2006). Five- and six-year-olds' implicit associations are substantially similar to those of
White adults; but because kindergartners have not yet internalized a self-censorship norm
against expressing racial bias, they will more easily express a preference for other White
children. See id. at 56. By ten years of age, however, most children's implicit biases no
longer match their explicit attitudes. Id.
154. Dovidio, supra note 124, at 838.
155. Id.
156. See Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Iniplicit Measures in Social Cognition
Research:Their Meaningq and Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297, 300-01 (2003).
157. See David M. Amodio & Matthew D. Lieberman, Pictures in Our Heads: Contri-
butions of JMRI to the Study of Prejudice and Stereotypit, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE,
STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 347 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2010); Jennifer L. Eber-
hardt, niagin Race, 60 Am. PSYCHOL. 181 (2005);A.J. Hart et al., Differential Response in the
Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs Ingroup Face Stimuli, 11 NEUROREPORT 2351 (2000).
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bias. Like intuitions, these psychological processes operate spontaneously
against members of stigmatized groups. Most Americans' expressed opin-
ions about racial equality stand in sharp contrast with their implicit
associations and behavior toward members of stigmatized groups. When
situations are clear, people are far less likely to treat others differently
based on race. When situations and the criteria for judging others are
ambiguous, however, people may spontaneously draw on stereotypes, re-
sulting in bias, and then rationalize their behavior after the fact based on
seemingly reasonable factors.""
B. Lay Theories of Racism
While social psychological research has demonstrated that prejudice
has morphed into more subtle forms, folk psychology-what most peo-
ple take for granted as true-says that racists are overt bigots. Research on
lay (folk) theories examines how observers interpret episodes of discrimi-
nation after the fact: for example, how witnesses perceive whether a
minority group member was the victim of racism. Lay theories about
racism represent different ways that judges could interpret allegations of
discrimination based on race.
Lay theories, also known as folk psychology, are organized
knowledge structures. 6o People draw on lay theories when making infer-
ences, predictions, explanations, and justifications. These theories act as
channels for feelings, thoughts, and actions for the object of the lay theo-
ry. Scientists have focused on two lay theories. 162 1The most dominant one,
particularly among majority group members, characterizes racist behavior
in overt, blatant terms.'6 ' The group that ascribes to this theory tends to
believe that discrimination is no longer a modern problem; prototypical
racism includes discouraging children from playing with Blacks, favoring
White over Black job applicants, or belonging to groups that promote
racial bigotry. This group does not view more subtle forms of
158. See generally, MILLER, supra note 120, at 102; Fiske, Wiat We Know About Bias,
supra note 132, at 125-26.
159. See C. Daryl Cameron et al., Do Theories of Implicit Race Bias Change Moraljudg-
ments?, 23 Soc. JUST. RES. 272 (2010); Samuel R. Sonimers & Michael I. Norton, Lay
Theories About White Racists: What Constitutes Racism (and What Doesn't), 9 GROUP PROCESS-
ES & INTERGROUP REL. 117, 131-32 (2006).
160. See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER, ACTs oF MEANING 35 (1990) ("All cultures have as one
of their most powerful constitutive instruments a folk psychology, a set of more or less
connected, more or less normative descriptions about how human beings 'tick,' what our
own and other minds are like, what one can expect situated action to be like, what are
possible modes of life, how one commits to them . .. .").
161. See, e.g., RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOcIAL JUDGMENT 4-6 (1980).
162. Sommers & Norton, supra note 159, at 119.
163. Id. at 131.
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prejudice-such as ambivalence, anxiety, and passive harm toward stereo-
typed individuals-as racism.'6 4 This group tends to consider mitigating
nonracial factors that may account for bias before drawing the inference
that racism occurred, unless the evidence of racism is incontrovertible. 6 1
The less prevalent lay theory characterizes racist behavior as includ-
ing both overt and subtle actions. 66 Those who ascribe to this theory
tend to include minority and some majority group members who are
particularly sensitive to less obvious cues of racism. This group is more
likely to view more diverse behavior as exhibiting racism-such as in-
group favoritism and ambivalence, disconfort, and passive harm toward
Blacks-and sees discrimination as an ongoing problem in American so-
- 168
ciety.
To summarize, there is a divide between the dominant folk theory
about racism and the science on how modern racism is manifested. The
dominant folk theory implies that racists behave in overt ways, but sci-
ence shows that prejudice operates in more subtle forms.
Even though natural psychological processes often result in bias,
these processes need not inevitably lead to biased decisions. People can
override stereotypes and implicit associations when they have both the
appropriate evidence before them and the motivation to reflect carefully
on information that differentiates one individual from others. In other
words, mindful reflection on individuating features is required.o7 0
C. Social Psychology Applied to Legal Decision Making
Social psychologists have long studied legal decision making and the
cognitive and motivational processes it involves."' For instance, they have
164. Id. at 128, 131-32.
165. Id. at 131-32.
166. See id. at 132.
167. Id. at 120 (describing the modern racism scale, an empirical method to measure
beliefs associated with subtle forms of racism). People who rank low on the modern rac-
ism scale theorize racism more broadly as a set of overt and subtle behaviors. Id.
168. Id. at 128, 131-32.
169. See Fazio & Olson, supra note 156, at 301; see also Galen V Bodenhausen & C.
Neil Macrae, The Self-Regulation of Intergroup Perception: Mechanisms and Consequences of
Stereotype Suppression, in STEREOTYPES AND STEREOTYPING 227, 227-75 (Macrae et al. eds.,
1996); Betram Garwonski & GalenV. Bodenhausen, Associative and Propositional Processes in
Evaluation:An Integrative Review of Implicit and Explicit Attitude Change, 132 PSYCHOL. BULL.
692, 694-95 (2006).
170. See Fazio & Olson, supra note 156, at 301.
171. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Robert Mauro, Psychology atid Law, in 2 THE HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 684, 698-99 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
Political scientists have also conducted excellent studies on the effect of sex and race on
judging. See, e.g., Christina Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal
Effects of Sex on judging, 54 Am.J. ON POL. Sci. 389 (2010).
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investigated the degree to which the defendant's race shapes jury decision
making. 7 2 In this regard, race matters a great deal in decisions about capi-
tal punishment: convicted murderers of White victims are more likely to
receive the death sentence than convicted murderers of Black victims. 7 3
For murderers of White victims, the degree to which defendants appear
more stereotypically Black (e.g., a broad nose, thick lips, dark skin) greatly
174
increases the likelihood that they will receive death sentences.
Legal decision making has been examined from a social cognition
perspective as well. Research on mock jurors has demonstrated that stere-
otypes shape the degree to which jurors engage in unbiased processing of
evidence. 7  Evidence that corroborates stereotypes receives more atten-
tion and is more readily incorporated into legal judgments than
stereotype-inconsistent evidence, which is often neglected. Recent re-
search has also demonstrated that judges, like the rest of us, draw on
heuristics and stereotypes when making decisions,17 1 which may reflect
inaccurate inferences and bias.'7 7 A recent study found that judges may
implicitly associate Blacks with negative attitudes and that these associa-
tions affect their decision making."
I. Hypotheses Drawn from Social Psychological Research
Having introduced social psychological findings on contemporary
racial bias as well as a brief history of the federal pleading standard, this
172. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom:
Perceptions of Guilty and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1367 (2000); Karl L.Wuensch et al., Racial Bias in Decisions Made by Mock jurors Evaluating
a Case of Sexual Harassment, 142 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 587 (2002).
173. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PsycHOL. Sci. 383, 383 (2006).
174. Id.
175. See GalenV. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Memory:
Testing Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 726,728 (1988).
176. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 18, at 778 ("[W]e found that
each of the 6ve illusions we tested had a significant impact on judicial decision making.
Judges, it seems, are human. Like the rest of us, their judgment is affected by cognitive
illusions that can produce systematic errors in judgment.").
177. See id.; Quintanilla, supra note 17, at 198-200; Rachlinski, Heuristics, supra note
18, at 568-71; see also Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAw 17, 17-21
(Gerd Gigerenzer & Christopher Engel eds., 2006); Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Short-
comings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social
Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTIcs AND BIASEs 129, 130 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982);Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability:A Heuristic for
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 209 (1973).
178. See Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, supra note
18, at 1209-10 (using the Implicit Association Test to examine judicial decision making
and finding a strong White preference among White judges).
25FALL 2011]
Michiganjournal of Race & Law
study now turns to three hypotheses drawn from social psychological lit-
erature in light of recent changes to the federal pleading standard:
(1) Shifting from Conley's notice-pleading standard to Iqbal's
plausibility standard, federal courts will increase the dis-
missal rate for Black plaintiffs' claims of race
discrimination.
(2) Despite the lenient construction traditionally given to
pro se complaints, federal courts will increase the dismis-
sal rate for Black pro se plaintiffs' claims of race
discrimination.
(3) Under Iqbal, White and Black judges will decide motions
to dismiss Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination
differently: White judges will dismiss claims at a higher
rate than Black judges.
Aversive bias suggests an overall rise in dismissal rates of Black plain-
tiffs' claims of discrimination, one greater than the rising base rate of
dismissals across all actions. This disparity in rates is due to Iqbal's shift of
pleading practice from a notice-based regime toward a regime where
courts screen claims based upon their own subjective evaluations and es-
timates of plausibility. Since evidence is not presented at the pleading
stage, federal judges do not have the opportunity to deliberate with indi-
viduating information, as is the case at summary judgment. With no
evidence, and relying on "common sense," courts are more likely to be
influenced by automatic stereotypes and implicit associations about race.
Aversive bias predicts uneven treatment in ambiguous cases where the
correct choice is unclear. A dismissal rate in these cases that rises more
than the base rate across all federal actions would suggest that social psy-
chological processes are affecting decision making.
Research on lay theories also predicts a rise in overall dismissal rates.
Racism is perceived as more overt than subtle, yet subtle discrimination is
prevalent in American society. Under Conley's liberal pleading standard,
plaintiffs would have withstood dismissal if they challenged subtle forms
of discrimination. Under lqbal's more rigorous plausibility standard, how-
ever, many federal judges will likely fail to perceive subtle discrimination
as plausibly suggesting unlawful discrimination. This research also implies
that while White judges tend to perceive discrimination as overt, Black
judges tend to perceive discrimination as both overt and subtle. The pre-
diction is that under Iqbal,White and Black judges will decide motions to
dismiss in ambiguous cases differently.
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DisciuMINATION LAW
Part Ill provides a primer on federal employment discrimination
law as background to PartV, which sets forth an empirical analysis of fed-
eral courts' adjudication of motions to dismiss Black plaintiffs' claims of
race discrimination and harassment brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. % 1981 ("Section 1981").
Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. "9 When plaintiffs litigate a
claim of race discrimination under Title VII, they can assert several types
of claims including disparate treatment, disparate impact, and harassment.
Most suits claim disparate treatment discrimination."
A disparate treatment claim alleges that an employer treated the
plaintiff less favorably than others because of the plaintiff's race."" The
ultimate issue in every disparate treatment case is whether the plaintiff
was the victim of intentional discrimination. 1' Unlike disparate treatment
claims, disparate impact claims involve employment practices that are fa-
cially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that affect one
group more harshly than another in practice. Disparate impact claims do
. .. .183
not turn on discriminatory intent.
Due to the difficulty of producing a "smoking gun" of intentional
discrimination, most plaintiffs offer circumstantial evidence (rather than
direct evidence) of disparate treatment discrimination. 4 That is, most
plaintiffs provide circumstantial evidence, allowing the court to infer that
an employer discriminated against them. This evidence is evaluated under
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting scheme, which allocates
the burden of production and an order for presenting proof."
Under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework, plaintiffs must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination-this requirement is
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). Title VII also prohibits retaliation against employees
who oppose discrimination or participate in Title VII processes. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)
(2006). This empirical study did not examine Black plaintiffs' claims of retaliation.
180. See 1 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAuL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 10-90 (ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law ed., 4th ed. 2007).
181. See 2000e-2(a) (2006); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003)
(quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977)).
182. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
183. See Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 52-53 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v.Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989)).
184. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (discussing direct versus
circumstantial evidence under Title VII); 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 180, at
10-30 (same).
185. Tex. Dep't ofCmty.Affairs v.Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 49 n.3
(interpreting the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (same); St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505-12 (1993) (same).
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not "intended to be rigid, mechanized . . . ritualistic,"16 or "onerous."1 8 7 It
is "merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of
common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination"
at summary judgment.18" This prima facie case also applies to claims of
race-based employment discrimination under Section 1981.189 To establish
a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she
is a member in a protected class, (2) she is qualified for a given job, (3) she
was subject to an adverse employment action, and (4) there is a causal
connection between the adverse action and the protected characteristic.'90
These legal tests for the prima facie case are flexible and often tailored to
different factual circumstances.'9' For example, in cases involving disparate
terms and conditions of employment, many courts construe the last ele-
ment of the prima facie case as requiring plaintiffs to prove that the
employer treated similarly situated employees outside her class more fa-
vorably.192
If a plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action.9 3 This burden is one of production, not per-
suasion; it involves "no credibility assessment."'9 If the employer meets
186. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting Furnco Con-
str. Corp. v.Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
187. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
188. U.S. Postal Serv Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (quoting
Furuco Constr., 438 U.S. at 577); see also Sivierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510-11.
189. With regard to the prima facie case, Section 1981 mirrors Title VII. See Johnson
v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F3d 922, 940 (7th Cir. 1996); Randle v. LaSalle Telecomns.,
Inc., 876 E2d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989). The present studies analyzed only those Section 1981 decisions where
federal courts evaluated the issue of race discrimination or the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
prima facie case as under Title VII.
190. See, e.g., McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F3d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2007).
191. See 1 LINDEMANN & GRossMAN, supra note 180, at 14-25.
192. See, e.g.,Winsley v. Cook Cnty., 563 E3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2009). In disparate-
treatment cases, the last element-whether the employer treated similarly situated people
outside of the plaintiff's protected class differently-is often determinative in whether a
claim withstands summary judgment. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 180, at
23. The courts of appeals disagree on how rigorously to apply this final element. See Su-
zanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 743-48 (2001) (explaining
that the "similarly-situated" element has in essence become a widely-employed heuristic).
Some require plaintiffs to show that "similarly-situated" employees were nearly identical
in all or most respects. See, e.g., Perez v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 395 F3d 206, 213
(5th Cir. 2004); Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cit. 1999). Others hold
plaintiffs to a less exacting standard. See, e.g., Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, 417 F3d 845, 852 (8th
Cir. 2005); Ortiz v. Norton, 254 F3d 889 (10th Cir. 2001).
193. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003).
194. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (quoting
St. Mary's Honor Ct. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
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this burden, the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears, and
the plaintiff is then afforded the opportunity to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the reasons offered by the employer were mere
pretext for discrimination."' When deciding whether the defendant's
explanation is pretextual, the trier of fact may consider the evidence that
established plaintiff's prima facie case and any inferences properly drawn
from that evidence.19 6 The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework has been
applied to claims of discriminatory hiring, discharge, discipline, promo-
tion, transfer, demotion, retaliation, and other adverse employment
.197
actions.
Racial harassment also violates Title VII.19 To prove harassment,
plaintiffs must show that they were subjected to discriminatory intimida-
tion, ridicule, and insults so severe or pervasive it altered the conditions of
their employment and created an abusive working environment.'" The
"mere utterance of an ... epithet which engenders offensive feelings in
an employee ... does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment
to implicate Title VII." 00 "'Talismanic expressions' of racial animus" are
not necessary; rather, "'code words'" may "'send[ a clear message and
carryf[ the distinct tone of racial motivations and implications: "201 When
determining whether a hostile work environment existed, courts consider
the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discrimi-
natory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and its effect on an
employee's work performance.
While these frameworks were designed to adjudicate claims at
summary judgment after evidence had been gathered and presented, over
time courts began applying these frameworks earlier in the litigation cy-
cle. * That is, federal courts began requiring plaintiffs to plead facts to
support these frameworks at the pleading stage, a practice eventually ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorenia NA., the Court
rejected this heightened pleading bar and held that plaintiffs are not re-
quired to plead specific facts establishing a prima case of discrimination.2 03
195. Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 49-50 n.3; Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.
196. Reeves,530 US. at 143.
197. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 180, at 12-13.
198. See, e.g., Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 E3d 790, 796 (8th Cir. 2004);
Patterson v. Cnty. of Onieda, 375 F3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004);White v. BFI Waste Servs.,
LLC, 375 E3d 288, 298 (4th Cit. 2004).
199. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998); Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993).
200. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jackson v. Flint
Ink N. Am. Corp., 370 F.3d 791, 794-96 (8th Cir. 2004); Ngeunjuntr v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 146 F3d 464,467 (7th Cit. 1998).
201. Galdarnez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1024 n.6 (9th Cit. 2005) (quoting McGinest
v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F3d 1103, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004)).
202. See supra Part I.
203. 534 U.S. 506, 511-13 (2002).
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Swierkiewicz held that imposing the prima facie case at the pleading stage
violates Rule 8(a).204 Swierkiewicz stands for the proposition that the pri-
ma facie case is not a pleading requirement, but rather an evidentiary
standard. Nonetheless, after Iqbal many federal courts are once again re-
quiring plaintiffs to plead facts to establish a prima facie case, and granting
dismissal when plaintiffs fail to do so.
IV A STUDY OF IQBAL'S EFFECT ON RACE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. Methodology
This research was designed to investigate whether Iqbal has increased
the dismissal rate for claims of race-based employment discrimination
filed by Black plaintiffs. Specifically, three studies examined whether fed-
eral district courts are granting an increased percentage of motions to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). These studies
focus on decision making by federal district judges.2 Iqbal provides them
with new discretion to decide whether claims of discrimination are plau-
sible, and these judges exercise this new discretion with a minimal
amount of oversight, as evidenced by the fact that only about twenty per-
206
cent of district court decisions are appealed. Like other empirical
studies, this investigation examined the broad question of what effect, if
any, Iqbal has had on motions to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6),m the
means by which defendants challenge the legal sufficiency of claims.208
204. Id. at 512.
205. The studies counted decisions by federal district courts only, not those of mag-
istrate judges. All decisions by magistrate judges were excluded from the computations,
whether or not those decisions were made by consent of the parties. See, e.g., Cotton v.
Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., No. 1:08CV1079, 2009 WL 1652145 (N.D. Ohio June 11,
2009). The study did count decisions by federal district courts in which they decided
whether to dismiss claims after receiving the report and recommendations of magistrate
judges. For example,Walker v. Univ. of Colo. All-White Bd. of Regents, No. 09-cv-01690-
PAB, 2010 WL 3259886, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 16, 2010) (concluding that plaintiffs Title
VII discrimination claim survived dismissal), accepting in part and rejecting in part No. 09-cv-
01690-PAB-MEH, 2010 WL 3259880, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2010) (Hegarty, Mag. J.)
(recommending denial of defendant's motion to dismiss as to the Title VII discrimination
claims) was counted as "Deny" because defendant challenged the sufficiency of plaintiff's
Title VII claim, and the district court ultimately denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
206. See C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTs 3, 8 (1996).
207. See Hatamyar, supra note 14; Hannon, supra note 10.
208. HERR, HAYDOCK & STEMPEL, supra note 63, § 9.06[A]; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009) ("Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state sufficient allegations to show their own involvement in clearly established unconsti-
tutional conduct.").
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Broad Westlaw searches2 " were designed to retrieve all cases decid-
ing motions to dismiss in employment discrimination cases filed by Black
210plaintiffs under Title VII or Section 1981. Searches for Title VII claims
yielded 263 decisions in the eighteen months before Twombly and 371
decisions in the eighteen-month range after Iqbal. To increase the power
211 212
of the study, the inquiry included cases deciding Section 1981 claims.
A search for relevant Section 1981 claims yielded 338 opinions in the
eighteen-month range before Twombly and 495 in the same timeframe
after Iqbal. Many of the cases retrieved from Westlaw fell outside the scope
of the study and were excluded. Finally, because this investigation focused
on claims of race-based discrimination and harassment by Black plaintiffs,
the study did not examine retaliation claims or claims based on other
protected characteristics (such as gender, national origin, and religion).21 3
The first wave of empirical legal research examined the broad ques-
tion of whether Iqbal has increased dismissal rates across all federal civil
209. All cases were obtained via the Westlaw federal district court database (DCT).
Many decisions were not published in the West Reporters and are available only electron-
ically. Other decisions unavailable on commercial databases were not examined. The study,
therefore, does not seek to establish the absolute rate of dismissals in all decisions, or to
measure the absolute number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions decided before and after lqbal.
The study remains significant, however, because jurists and advocates do not form impres-
sions about what the law is from inaccessible law; if a disparate effect is demonstrated in
available law, that effect will have practical significance for how jurists and advocates han-
dle cases. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary judgment in Federal
Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehen or Coniorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 604
(2004); Hillel Y Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV.
973, at 985, 988-94; Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe:A Law of Personaljurisdiction, 68
Mo. L. REv. 753,777 n.113 (2003).
210. The database of cases is available upon request.
211. See ARTHUR ARON ET AL., STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SocIAL SCIENCES
210, 225-27 (4th ed. 2008) ("The statistical power of a research study is the probability
that the study will produce a statistically significant result if the research hypothesis is
true.").
212. Some plaintiffs choose to file claims of discrimination under Section 1981 ra-
ther than Title VII. Because federal district courts use the same test for intentional
discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981, see supra note 189 and accompanying
text, Section 1981 cases were included in the study, e.g., Dorsey v. Ga. Dep't of State Rd.
& Tollway Auth. SRTA, No. 1:09-CV-1182-TWT, 2009 WL 2477565, at *6 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 10, 2009). Some plaintiffs advanced claims under both Title VII and Section 1981;
since courts evaluate the question of intentional discrimination similarly under both pro-
visions, the study counted only the disposition for the Title VII claim to avoid double
counting. E.g., Hanks v. Shinseki, No. 3:08-CV-1594-G, 2009 WL 2002917, at *1 (N.D.
Tex.Jul. 9, 2009) (granting dismissal ofTitleVII and Section 1981 claims under McDonnell
Douglas framework).
213. The study also included claims filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Connission (EEOC), in which the EEOC sued on behalf of Black employees. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Scrub, Inc., No. 09 C 4228, 2009 WL 3458530, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2009)
("The complaint sufficiently states disparate treatment and disparate impact claims under
TitleVII.").
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rights cases or all Title VII cases. Scholars have found different rates of
dismissal, but most scholars who have examined federal case law report
rates following the same trend: higher rates under Twombly and Iqbal than
under Conley.'" This Article joins other scholars in charting a new direc-
tion for empirical legal research, one that closely examines how Iqbal has
affected narrow categories of claims. This second wave draws on the no-
tion of "situation types" or "particularized situations," as articulated by
Llewellyn and other Legal Realists."' Believing that courts do not apply
rules similarly across all conditions, Llewellyn and the Legal Realists
maintained that narrow and concrete studies were needed to examine
how courts treat particular kinds of situations.2 16 This Article tests the hy-
pothesis that Iqbal's plausibility standard has had a statistically significant
effect on Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination and racial harass-
ment in ambiguous cases.
Because "ambiguousness" is a construct that cannot be observed di-
rectly, an operational definition is necessary to examine whether social
psychological findings translate into judicial decision making.1 Research
214. Hatamyar, supra note 14, at 630 tbl.D (finding that for all Title VII claims, the
dismissal rate rose from 42% percent under Conley, to 54% percent under Twomnbly, to 53%
percent under Iqbal); Hannon, supra note 10, at 1837 tbl.3 (finding that the dismissal rate
for all civil rights claims rose from 41.7% under Conley to 52.9% under Tivotbly); Joseph
Seiner, Tie Trouble ivitlh Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Ernployrnent Discriuia-
tion Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1011, 1030 tbl.A (2009) (finding that the dismissal rate rose
from 54.5% under Conley to 57.1% under Twombly). The Federal Judicial Center (FJC)
recently released a study on Jqbal's effects, examining orders on multiple federal court
CM-ECF dockets rather than federal case law. For motions to dismiss with prejudice, the
FJC study found that the dismissal rate has not changed in a statistically significant man-
ner. JOE CECIL ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MOTION To DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RULES (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf. The report also found that motions to dismiss
were granted more often post-lqbal than pre-Tivonibly across all counseled cases, with the
grant rate rising from 66% to 75% (When considering orders granting dismissal with
leave to amend and orders granting dismissal with prejudice). Id. at 13. For an in-depth
assessment of the FJC's study, see Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal's Measure: An As-
sessnent of the Federal judicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss (Univ. of Houston Law
Ctr., Working Paper No. 1904134, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstractid=1904134. In contrast to the FJC report, a follow-up test was per-
formed on the claims studied, which revealed that the rising dismissal rate was statistically
significant for motions to dismiss Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination granted
with prejudice.
215. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 16, at 28-30; Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurispru-
dence:Th7e Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 457-60 (1930).
216. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 16, 28-30; Llewellyn, supra note 215, at 457-60.
217. Operational definitions describe a set of procedures that researchers use "to
establish ... the existence ... of the phenomen[a] described" by the construct. CHAVA
FRANKFORT-NACHMIAS & DAVID NACHMIAS, RESEARCH METHODS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
28 (6th ed. 2000); see also SHERRI L. JACKSON, RESEARCH METHODS AND STATISTICS 31
(2003); KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 41.
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demonstrates that decision makers exhibit aversive racism in ambiguous
situations,2 ]8 but not in unequivocal situations.219 In particular, Dovidio's
seinal study, described in Part II, suggests that when judges must adjudi-
cate the plausibility of ambiguous claims, rather than clearly weak or
clearly strong claims, aversive racism may be exhibited. 220
The present study, therefore, operationalized ambiguousness (and
"ambiguous claims") by excluding claims dismissed on technical grounds
for failing to comply with the prerequisites of a viable Title VII action.
There are two prerequisites for a viable Title VII action: "filing timely
charges of employment discrimination with the [EEOC] and ... receiv-
ing and acting upon the Commission's statutory notice of the right to
sue. "2 21 Exhaustion of the EEOC administrative procedures is mandatory.
First a plaintiff must file an EEOC charge of discrimination within 300
days of the alleged discriminatory practice. 2 Second, plaintiffs must file
suit within ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the
EEOC."3 The present studies applied these statutory prerequisites when
drawing a distinction between unambiguous and ambiguous claims. Un-
ambiguously weak claims were those where plaintiffs failed to file a
timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC or failed to sue within
ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter. 2 2 Unambiguously weak
218. Aberson & Ettline, supra note 146, at 26; Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism,
supra note 117, at 16.
219. Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions, supra note 119, at
317-18.
220. Id.
221. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); 2 LINDEMANN &
GRossMAN, supra note 180, at 1749.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006); 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 180, at
1750-51. This 300-day timeline applies in deferral states (those having their own state
agency that challenges employment discrimination). A 180-day timeline applies in non-
deferral states. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(e)(1); 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 180, at
1750-51. While Title VII technically requires charging parties to first file their charge of
discrimination with a deferral state agency, work sharing agreements between the EEOC
and state agencies are prevalent and allow plaintiffi to file a charge with the EEOC first
instead. The accrual date for this period is the date on which the adverse employment
action is communicated to the plaintiff (or when plaintiff becomes aware of facts giving
rise to a claim of discrimination). See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259 (1980);
Beamon v. Marshall & Isley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2005); Cada v. Bax-
ter Healthcare Corp., 920 E2d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1990).
223. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(f)(1).While federal courts might allow for equitable tolling
of these limitations periods, they do so only in narrow instances and tend to rigorously
apply these deadlines. See, e.g., Zipes v.Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
224. The study excluded claims dismissed as untimely If the defendant moved to
dismiss a claim for failure to exhaust EEOC remedies or for untimeliness, and the court
granted that motion, then I excluded the decision from consideration. See, e.g., Henderson
v.Wal Mart Stores Tex. LLC, No. H-10-0317, 2010 WL 1525551, at *4-8 (S.D.Tex. Apr.
14, 2010) (dismissing Title VII for untimeliness). Since I applied this rule consistently, the
study excluded cases that rejected the defendant's motion to dismiss based solely on the
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claims also included those (1) where plaintiffs failed to exhaust their rem-
edies, such as where plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination fell outside
the scope of their charges filed with the EEOC;22 5 and (2) where plaintiffs
sought to hold coworkers liable, rather than an employer, which is outside
the scope of Title VII. 226 Since these cases turn on clear rules applied in
heuristic fashion, these cases are not ambiguous (i.e., plaintiff either did or
227did not comply with these heuristic-like rules).
The remaining cases were deemed ambiguous because they required
courts to evaluate whether Black plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded claims
of race discrimination or harassment. These cases turned largely on
whether plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded discrimination under Rule
8(a). By operationalizing the concept of "ambiguous" claims in this way,
the study examined the narrow category of cases most suitable to test the
hypotheses of aversive racism and lay theories.228 Next, each case was
analyzed22 9 and the dependent variable was coded according to the three
possible outcomes for decisions under Rule 12(b)(6): granted, denied, or
granted-in-part/denied-in-part.2 o The research examined the frequency
mistaken grounds that plaintiff's Title VII claim was untimely. See, e.g., Young v. Kelsey
Care Advantage, No. H-09-1925,2010 WL 1404215 (S.D.Tex. Mar. 31, 2010); Byrd v. Cal.
Superior Court, No. C 08-04387 MHP, 2009 WL 2031761, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 8,
2009).Where federal courts rejected an untimeliness argument but also considered a Rule
8 basis for dismissal, the study counted the Rule 8 decision on the claim. See, e.g., Miller v.
Eagle Tug Boat Cos., No. 09-0401-CG-B, 2009WL 4751079 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 8,2009).
225. The same exclusionary rule was applied here as well. See supra note 224. If de-
fendant moved to dismiss a claim for failure to exhaust remedies with the EEOC, and the
court granted that motion, then the study excluded that decision from consideration. See,
e.g., Rogers v. ConMed, Inc., No. CCB-09-3397, 2010 WL 3056666 (D. Md. Aug. 3,
2010). Where courts rejected defendants' exhaustion argument but also considered an
argument under Rule 8, the study counted the Rule 8 decision on the claim. See, e.g.,
Miller, 2009 WL 4751079.
226. Individual employees are not liable under Title VII. See generally Sheridan v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F 3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996). The same rules de-
scribed in notes 224 and 225 were also applied to this basis for dismissal.
227. Heuristic in the sense that these rules at the threshold operate like bright lines,
like rules of thumb, providing for parsimonious decision making. See Gigerenzer, supra
note 177, at 391-408.
228. See supra Part II.B.
229. The SPSS database is available upon request. Independent variables included:
date (pre-Twombly versus post-Iqbal), federal judicial circuit, federal judicial district, pro se
status of the plaintiff, and race of the federal district judge. For the dependent variable, the
study recorded only rulings on claims of race-based discrimination or harassment chal-
lenged by a 12(b)(6) (or 12(c)) motion.
230. The study coded decisions "granted," "denied," or "mixed." This nethod of
coding motions to dismiss rulings was drawn from Professor Hatamyar's research. Hata-
myar, supra note 14, at 596, 601. Rulings were "granted" when a motion to dismiss was
granted for all race-based claims that the defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 8. The
study coded decisions "denied" when a motion to dismiss was denied for all race-based
claims in dispute. The study coded decisions "mixed" when a motion was denied at least
in part for race-based claims: the court accepted part, but rejected part, of defendants'
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of decisions in each of these three categories eighteen months before
Twombly and eighteen months after Iqbal.231
B. Results
This Article presents first the results for the overall change in dis-
missal rates for Black plaintiffs' claims of race-based employment
discrimination, and then the change in dismissal rates for Black plaintiffs
who were pro se. Finally, it presents the dismissal rates for cases decided
by White versus Black judges under Iqbal. The studies used chi-square
tests to examine whether these changes were statistically significant.
STUDY 1:
HAS IQBAL INCREASED THE DISMISSAL RATE
FOR BLACK PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS OF RACE DISCRIMINATION
IN THE WORKPLACE?
The first study tested the prediction that, in light of social psycho-
logical phenomena discussed in Part II, federal district courts would grant
a larger proportion of motions to dismiss under Iqbal's plausibility stand-
ard than under Conley's notice-pleading rule when adjudicating Black
plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination in the workplace. Results are pre-
sented in Table 1 and Figure 1.
argument under Rule 8, and in turn allowed at least one race-based claim to withstand
dismissal.
231. Because Tivombly was decided on May 21, 2007, the 18-month range for pre-
Tivombly decisions was from October 15, 2005, to May 20, 2007. Iqbal was decided on
May 18, 2009. To allow federal courts to sufficiently disseminate and synthesize lqbal, I
began the range on June 1, 2009; therefore, the 18-month range for post-lqbal decisions
was from June 1, 2009, to December 1, 2010.
232. A chi-square test is a hypothesis-testing procedure used when the variable of
interest is a nominal variable. See ARON ET AL., supra note 211, at 359-61; JACKsoN, supra
note 217, at 183-85. The chi-square test is used to determine "whether the difference
between observed ... and expected frequencies ... is statistically significant." FRANKFORT-
NACHMIAS & NACHMIAS, supra note 217, at 450. Cramr's V coefficient is an effect-size
measure for a chi-square test for independence used with a contingency table that is larger
than 2 x 2. For the contingency tables of this study (df-1), a Cramn&'s V coefficient of.10
indicates a small effect size, .30 is medium, and .50 is large. See ARON ET AL., supra note
211, at 377.
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TABLE 1:
PERCENTAGE OF RULINGS IN STUDY FOR BLACK PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
OF RACE DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
OBSERVED FREQUENCY (EXPECTED FREQUENCY)
PERCENTAGE IN THE STUDY
Grant Deny Mixed Total
Conley 16(32.6) 59 (40.5) 3 (4.9) 78
20.50% 75.60% 3.80%
lqbal 71(54.4) 49(67.5) 10(8.1) 130
54.60% 37.70% 7.70%
Total 87 108 13 208
41.80% 51.90% 6.30%
Pearson X'(2, N-208) = 28.23, p<.000
FIGURE 1.
PERCENTAGE OF RULINGS IN STUDY FOR BLACK PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
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Study 1 shows that in ambiguous cases, federal district courts have
increased the dismissal rate for Black plaintiffs' claims of race-based em-
ployment discrimination: after Iqbal, it is 2.66 times more likely that these
claims will be dismissed when challenged as insufficient under Rule 8(a).
Federal courts are increasingly concluding that Black plaintiffs have failed
to sufficiently plead prima facie cases and plausible claims of discraniina-
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tion. The increase in dismissal rates across time was statistically signifi-
233
cant.
STUoY 2:
HAS IQBAL INCREASED THE DISMISSAL RATE FOR
BLACK PRO SE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS OF RACE DISCRIMINATION
IN THE WORKPLACE?
The second study tested the prediction that federal district courts
would grant a higher proportion of motions to dismiss under Iqbal than
under Conley for claims of race-based employment discrimination
brought by pro se Black plaintiffs.
TABLE 2.
PERCENTAGE OF RULINGS IN STUDY FOR BLACK PRO SE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
OBSERVED FREQUENCY (EXPECTED FREQUENCY)
PERCENTAGE IN THE STUDY
Grant Deny Mixed Total
Conley 8(13.9) 17(10.1) 0(1.0) 25
32.00% 68,00% 0.00%
Iqbal 33(27.1) 13(19.9.) 3(2.0) 49
67.30% 26.50% 6.10%
Total 41 30 3 74
1_ 55.40% 40.50% 4.10%
Pearson X2 (2, N-74) = 12.286, p-.002
233. Using SPSS, the statistical software package, a chi-squared test was performed. A
two-way contingency table analysis was used to evaluate the change in dismissal rates. The
two variables were (1) time period when the motion to dismiss was decided with two
levels (pre-Twombly versus post-Iqbal), and (2) decision with three levels (grant, deny,
mixed).Time period and decision were found to be significantly related, Pearson X2 (2, N
= 208) = 28.23, p = .000, Cranir's V = .368. Follow-up pairwise comparisons were con-
ducted to evaluate the difference among the columns. The Holm's sequential Bonferroni
method was used to control for Type I error at the .05 level across all three columns. The
only significant pairwise difference was the comparison between grant and deny, which
accounted for 26.74 of the Pearson X2 and was significant p = .000, Cram&'s V = .370.
The proportion of grants (i.e., dismissals) increased across time.
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FIGURE 2.
PERCENTAGE OF RULINGS IN STUDY FOR BLACK PRO SE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
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Under Iqbal, federal district courts increasingly dismissed Black pro
se plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination in the workplace: it is 2.10
times more likely that these claims will be dismissed '2"This surge in dis-
missal rates has occurred despite the Supreme Court's instruction to con-
construe pro se complaints liberally and to hold pro se filings to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."'
STUDY 3:
UNDER IQBAL, ARE WHITE AND BLACK JUDGES DECIDING MOTIONS
To Dismiss DIFFERENTLY?
A third study was conducted to test the prediction that White and
Black judges would decide motions to dismiss differently under Iqbal.
That divergence would be consistent with research on lay theories of dis-
234. As with Table 1, a chi-squared distribution test was performed. Results indicat-
ed that the increase in grant rates (dismissal rates) across time was statistically significant.A
two-way contingency table analysis was used to evaluate the changing dismissal rates.
Time period and decision were found to be significantly related, Pearson X2 (2, N=74) =
12.286, p = .002, Cramr's V = .407. Because two cells (33%) had expected counts of less
than 5, a Fisher's exact test was performed, which confirmed that the omnibus results of
the 2 x 3 contingency table were statistically significant, p = .001. Follow-up pairwise
comparisons were conducted to evaluate the difference among the columns. The Holm's
sequential Bonferroni method was used to control for Type I error at the .05 level across
all three columns. The only pairwise difference that was significant was the comparison
between grant and deny, which accounted for 10.483 of the Pearson X2 and was signifi-
cant p = .001, Cramb&'s V = .384. For unrepresented Blacks, grants (dismissals) increased
across time, and denials decreased across time.
235. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
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crimination regarding how judges draw inferences and make probabilistic
judgments.
TABLE 3.
PERCENTAGE OF RULINGS IN STUDY FOR WHITE VERSUS BLACK JUDGES
OBSERVED FREQUENCY (EXPECTED FREQUENCY)
PERCENTAGE IN THE STUDY
Grant Deny Mixed Total
White Judges 65 (61.8) 41(42.4) 7 (8.8) 113
57.50% 36.30% 6.20%
Black Judges 5 (8.2) 7 (5.6.) 3 (1.2) 15
33.30% 46.7% 20.0%
Total 70 48 10 128
54.70% 37.50% 7.80%1
Pearson X2 (2, N-128) 5.028, p=.081
FIGURE 3:
PERCENTAGE OF RULINGS IN STUDY FOR WHITE VERSUS BLACK JUDGES
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Study 3 reveals a robust trend in which White judges are dismissing
Black plaintiffs' claims of employment discrimination under Iqbal at a
higher rate (57.5%) than Black judges (33.3%).236 These results were
236. For data on the demographics of federal judges, see Judges of the United States
Courts, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited
Feb. 16, 2011).
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marginally significant;... given the limited data, it is unclear whether the
lack of clear significance is due to different grant rates or different mixed
rates when deciding motions to dismiss: As discussed later in PartV the
disparity is largely a result of differences in how courts decide whether
Blacks have pleaded enough to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion or a plausible claim of discrimination.
C. Discussion
These three empirical studies offer a fine-grained examination of
Iqbal's effect in a particular context, focusing closely on how courts have
adjudicated Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination in the work-
place. The studies investigate Iqbal's effect in ambiguous cases, those that
were not dismissed at the threshold for failing to comply with formal
prerequisites for filing suit. In keeping with the first wave of empirical
research on Iqbal's effect in federal actions, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate
that dismissal rates have risen overall. 239 The results of Studies 1 and 2
were statistically significant, and Study 3 revealed a marginally significant
trend. These findings are consistent with the social psychological research
discussed in Part II. Research on aversive racism and lay theories of rac-
ism suggested that under Iqbal's plausibility standard, federal courts would
increasingly dismiss Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination, particu-
larly in ambiguous cases. Research indicates that judgment and decision
making are influenced by stereotypes, implicit associations, and lay theo-
237. A two-way contingency table analysis was conducted to evaluate whether the
proportions were similar or dissimilar. Judge's race and decisions were found to be mar-
ginally significant, Pearson X2 (2, N=128) = 5.028, p = .081, Cramr's V = .198. Because
one cell (16.7%) had expected counts of less than 5, a Fisher's exact test was performed,
which confirmed that the frequencies in the table were marginally significant, p = .063.
Follow-up pairwise comparisons were conducted to evaluate the difference among the
columns. The Holm's sequential Bonferroni method was used to control for Type I error
at the .05 level across all three columns. The only significant pairwise difference was the
comparison between grant and grant/deny, which accounted for 5.079 of the Pearson X2
and was significant p = .024, Cramr's V = .252. The pattern in which White and Black
judges are deciding motions to dismiss differently is trending toward statistical significance.
238. A two-level logistic regression ("grant" versus "deny" and "grant & deny") with
judge's race and plaintiff gender as predictors was conducted using SPSS (controlling also
for whether decisions were made after a magistrate judge's recommendation).This analysis
revealed a marginally significant effect of judge's race on the grant rate for claims of race
discrimination after Iqbal, odds ratio = 2.89, Wald = 3.20, p = .07. Specifically, White
judges were more than twice as likely to grant dismissal as were Black judges. Further,
plaintiff gender was a significant predictor of the grant rate, odds ratio = 2.27, Wald =
4.90, p = .03. Judges were more than twice as likely to grant dismissal when the plaintiff
was a Black female compared to when the plaintiff was a Black male. For an excellent
discussion of logistic regression, see BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING
MULTIVARIATE STATISTIcs 437-504 (5th ed. 2007).
239. See Hatamyar, supra note 14, at 597-615.
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ries of racism, which results in decisions biased toward dismissal. Studies 1
and 2 demonstrate that the dismissal rate for Blacks in employment dis-
criniination cases has risen sharply. What is striking is the magnitude of
this effect: Studies 1 and 2 suggest that, for these cases, the dismissal rate
increased more sharply than the first wave of studies indicated.240
One threshold question is whether the increased dismissal rate for
Black plaintiffs' claims is attributable simply to the rise in the base rate for
dismissals across all actions. In this regard, Professor Hatamyar examined
1,039 cases and demonstrated that the increase in dismissal rates across all
actions rose from 46% under Conley to 56% under Iqbal, meaning that the
base rate for dismissals was 1.21 times higher. Her study demonstrated
that for Title VII claims, the dismissal rate rose from 42% under Conley to
53% under Iqbal, 1.26 times the base rate. Had the increase in dismissals
merely reflected a rise in the base rate for dismissals across all actions, the
increases documented in Studies 1 and 2 would have reflected a similar
rise in the base rate. In fact, Study 1 demonstrates that dismissal rates rose
even more sharply: 2.66 times for Black plaintiffs' claims of racial discrim-
ination. Figure 4 demonstrates this effect.
240. Id. Under Conley, if Blacks exhausted their claims with the EEOC and timely
filed suit, it was relatively certain that they would survive the pleading stage, withstand
defendants' motions to dismiss, and be allowed to present their claims at summary judg-
ment. Under Conley, district courts dismissed only 20.5% of those claims. After Iqbal, in
counseled cases district courts dismissed 54.6% of those claims, and in pro se cases district
courts dismissed 67.3% of those claims. See supra Part IV.B.
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FIGURE 4:
CHANGING DISMISSAL RATE IN STUDY COMPARED TO CHANGING
DISMISSAL RATE FOR ALL CLAIMS AND TITLE VII CLAIMS
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If increased dismissal rates were simply attributable to a new
pleading rule, White and Black judges would apply that rule similarly.
Study 3, however, reports a post-Iqbal trend: Black and White judges are
deciding claims of racial discrimination differently at the pleading
stage,241 with White judges more likely to grant dismissal. 242 This emerg-
Ing pattern is consistent with research on lay theories of discrimination.
Some White judges may be attributing the challenges Blacks face in the
workplace to stereotypical characteristics, rather than to subtle preju-
dice. In contrast, many Black judges may be drawing on lay theories
that take into account both overt and subtle prejudice. It appears that
judging may be influenced by preconceptions about the prevalence of
S n e 243prejudice in American society.
241. Scholars have identified differences in how Black and White judges granted
motions for summary judgment for claims of race harassment in decisions that predated
Twonibly. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind judge:An En,-
pirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1117 (2009).
242. These results should be interpreted with caution, however, given the small sam-
ple size of decisions in the study adjudicated by Black federal judges. The pattern is
trending toward statistical significance and should be revisited once more cases are decid-
ed.
243. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 65-68 (2008).
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V. GENERAL DiscUSSION OF IQBAL's EFFECT ON CLAIMS OF RACE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
Scholars warned that Twombly and Iqbal would move the pivotal
point at which courts screen cases earlier in time from summary judg-
ment to the motion to dismiss, 244 and that this move would be
pronounced in employment discrimination cases. The motion to dismiss
would, in effect, become the new summary judgment motion. The pre-
sent research demonstrates that these concerns are well founded. For
Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination, many courts are rigorously
applying 1qbal as if the Court called for a heightened pleading bar. Iqbal
has resulted in elastic pleading standards that are difficult to apply consist-
ently.
In short, Iqbal has created legal uncertainty,2 4 6 which is especially
pronounced when adjudicating claims of race discrimination in the
workplace. It is unclear whether plaintiffs are now required to plead facts
establishing a prima facie case, and if so, how elaborate that showing must
be.247 That is, federal courts have difficulty reconciling Iqbal with
Swierkiewicz. * As the Ninth Circuit recently lamented, the juxtaposition
of Swierkiewicz, on the one hand, and Iqbal, on the other, is "perplex-
. ,,249
ng.
One line ofjurisprudence holds that Swierkiewicz remains good law
after Iqbal.250 The Seventh Circuit has concluded that, given the Court's
244. Miller, supra note 12, at 15.
245. Thomas, supra note 12, at 18.
246. See In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 [3d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 2010);
Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F3d 202,213 (2d Cir. 2008).
247. See supra Part III.
248. See supra Part III. Federal courts are splintered. See, e.g.,Winston v. Clough, 712
E Supp. 2d 1, 13 n.10 (D.D.C. 2010) ("Swierkiewicz ... is still good law."); Dave v. Lanier,
606 E Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2009) ("It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all ele-
ments of his prima facie case in the complaint."); accord Moore v. Metro. Human Serv.
Dist., No. 09-6470, 2010 WL 1462224, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010) ("[T]he current
pleading standards for a Title VII case ... reconcile[s] Swierkiewicz, Tivonibly, and Iqbal.");
Gillman v. Inner City Broad. Corp., No. 08 Civ. 8909(LAP), 2009 WL 300244, at *3
(S.D.N.Y Sept. 18, 2009) ("Iqbal was not meant to displace Swierkiewicz's teachings about
pleading standards for employment discrimination claims."). But see, e.g., Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 E3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) ("[Bjecause Conley has been specifically re-
pudiated by both Tivombly and Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz.").
249. See Starr v. Baca, No. 09-55233, 2011 WL 2988827, at *13 (9th Cir. July 25,
2011).
250. See EEOC v. Propak Logistics, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-311, 2010 WL 3081339, at
*4--5 (WD.N.C. Aug. 6, 2010); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL
2977297, at *3-4 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010) (affirming the "validity" of Swierkiewicz); Rouse
v. Berry, 680 F Supp. 2d 233, 236 (D.D.C. 2010) (disavowing any retreat fron Swierkiewicz,
at least "[i]n the context of a fairly straightforward employment discrimination com-
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explicit decision to reaffirm the validity of Swierkiewicz in Twombly, "in
many straightforward cases, it will not be any more difficult today for a
plaintiff to meet th[e] [pleading] burden than it was before the Court's
recent decisions."25' The Second Circuit has also reaffirmed Swierkiewicz,
finding that "[t]here is no heightened pleading requirement for civil
rights complaints alleging racial animus.',25 2 Similarly, some courts have
held that even after Iqbal, the prima facie elements are "an evidentiary
standard," not a "pleading requirement," particularly in discrimination
cases where discovery unearths relevant facts.' 3 Other courts have held
that while plaintiffs are not required to plead every element of a prima
facie case, they must allege more than conclusory allegations; they must
give the defendant "fair notice of what plaintiffls'] claim[s] [are] and the
grounds upon which [they] rest[]."255 These courts conclude that although
Swierkiewicz relied on Conley, Swierkiewicz remains good law even after
Conley's demise.256
In contrast, another line of jurisprudence requires plaintiffs to plead
facts establishing the prima facie case. For example, in Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, the Third Circuit held that Swierkiewicz is invalid because it was
premised on Conley. 25 Third Circuit courts have held that, while not re-
quired to prove elements at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must nonetheless
plead facts that "raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
plaint"); EEOC v. Scrub, Inc., No. 09 C 4228, 2009 WL 3458530, at *2 (N.D. 111. Oct. 26,
2009); EEOC v. Universal Brixius, LLC, 264 F.R.D. 514, 515-17 (E.D. Wis. 2009); Gill-
man, 2009 WL 3003244, at *3.
251. Svanson, 614 E3d at 404.
252. Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 E3d 202, 215 (2d Cit. 2008); see also Arista Records,
LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
253. See, e.g., Bryant v. Pepco, 730 E Supp. 2d 25, 28 (D.D.C. 2010) (collecting cases).
254. See Keyes v. Wayne State Univ., No. 10-12087, 2010 WL 4054500, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 5, 2010) ("Plaintiff is not required to make out a prima facie case in her Com-
plaint."); Apau v. Printpack Inc., 722 E Supp. 2d 489, 492 (D. Del. 2010); Myles v. A & L,
Inc,, No. 08-CV-205C, 2009 WL 4892098, at *3 (WD.N.Y Dec. 11, 2009).
255. Nyame v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., No. 08 Civ. 9656(DAB), 2010 WL
1379794, at *5 (S.D.N.Y March 31, 2010); see also Mayale-Eke v. Merrill Lynch, 754 F
Supp. 2d 372, 377 (D.R.I. 2010) ("[A] complaint need not establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss, but the claim must be facially
plausible and must give fair notice to the defendants of the basis for the claim."); Martin v.
ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 710 F. Supp. 2d 875, 887 (D. Minn. 2010) ("[A] complaint in an
employment discrimination lawsuit need not contain specific facts establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination.").
256. See, e.g., Drew v. Plaza Constr. Corp., 688 E Supp. 2d 270, 275 (S.D.N.Y 2010).
257. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cit. 2009). Another
Third Circuit panel questioned Fowler's analysis of Swierkiewicz and dismissed it as dicta. In
re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 E3d 300, 319 n.17 (3d Cit. 2010).The Third Circuit
later held that Twonibly does not enact a heightened pleading standard. West Penn Alleghe-
ny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 E3d 85,98 (3d Cir. 2010).
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evidence of the necessary element[s]."2 58 Other courts have concluded
that plaintiffs must plead facts for each element of a prima facie case.2
Fourth Circuit courts have held that while a plaintiff need not plead facts
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the basic pleading re-
quirement requires plaintiffs to set forth facts sufficient to allege each
element of their claim.2 6 Finally, at least one Eleventh Circuit court has
held that "it is necessary for a plaintiff to 'plead sufficient factual matter to
show that' a defendant acted not for a legitimate, non-pretextual reason,
'but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race.' 261
Other courts seemed uncertain and divided: plaintiffs need not
plead a prima facie case, yet such a showing is still relevant to deterniin-
'62ing whether a complaint states a claim that is plausible on its face. Yet
others cite Swierkiewicz for the ban on heightened pleading, but nonethe-
less explain that the prima facie standard is a "useful structure" to
determine whether plaintiffs have presented a reasonable inference of dis-
- .. 263
crunnation.
In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Skinner v.
Switzer,2 64 the Seventh and Second Circuits' approaches are most correct.
In Skinner, the Court again reaffirmed the vitality of Swierkiewicz.265 It is
258. Cameau v. Mount Airy No. I LLC, No. 3:10-CV-1249, 2010 WL 5093083, at
*3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Davis v. City of
Newark, No. 09-1032, 2010 WL 3636243, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2010); Crittendon v.
Grove, No. 09-246, 2010 WL 2723215, at *2 (WD. Pa.July 8, 2010).
259. See Curry v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 3:08cv60 9 , 2010 WL 431692, at *2
(W.D.N.C. 2010). The Eleventh Circuit has held that, after Iqbal, civil rights complaints
must contain "either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Randall v. Scott, 610 E3d
701,707 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. See King v. United Way of Cent. Carolinas, Inc., No. 3:09cvl64, 2010 WL
1958128, at *5 (WD.N.C. May 14,2010); Law v.Autozone Stores, Inc., No. 4:09cv00017,
2009 WL 4349165, at *2 (WD.Va. Nov. 25, 2009); cf Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186,
193 (4th Cit. 2009) ("[E]ven though 'Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure
from the hyper-technical code pleading regime of a prior era, it does not unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.' " (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009))).
261. Sojourner v. Cherry, No. 1:09-CV-3460-TWT, 2010 WL 3516830, at *2 (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 31, 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50).
262. See King, 2010 WL 1958128, at *5 (WD.N.C. 2010); Chacko v. Worldwide
Flight Servs., Inc., No. 08-CV-2363 (NGG)(JO), 2010 WL 424025, at *3 (E.D.N.Y Feb.
3, 2010); Orozco v. City of Murfreesboro, No. 3:09-cv-00752, 2009 WL 4042586, at *3
(M.D. Tenn. Nov.19, 2009).
263. See Apau v. Printpack Inc., 722 F Supp. 2d 489, 492 (D. Del. 2010).
264. 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011).
265. Id. at 1296 ("[Tjhe question below was not whether [plaintifl] vill ultimately
prevail on his ... claim ... but whether his complaint was sufficient to cross the federal
court's threshold .... Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally re-
quires only a plausible 'short and plain' statement of the plaintiff's claim, not an exposition of
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too early, however, to tell whether federal courts will re-assess the broad-
est constructions of Iqbal in light of the Court's recent decision in Skinner.
A. Similarly Situated Employees
Much variance stems from how federal courts decide the last ele-
ment of the prima facie case. Consistent with the science discussed in
Part II, this final element is of marked significance. This section reviews
decisions to show how courts have used the similarly-situated element
under Iqbal to dismiss claims that would likely have survived under
Conley. Those who hold a lay theory of overt racism view racism as re-
quiring that Blacks be treated blatantly worse than Whites. It appears that
many courts hold this lay theory and apply this element more strictly
under Iqbal than under Conley: they require greater factual precision in
identifying which White employees were similarly situated, how they
were similarly situated, and how they were treated more favorably.
One line of authority applies this final element strictly. These courts
cite Swierkiewicz in passing, but ultimately conclude that Black plaintiffs
have not pleaded enough to show that they were treated differently than
similarly situated Whites. In some cases, plaintiffs pleaded rather generally
that they were treated differently than Whites. In these cases, courts ap-
plied Iqbal and characterized the broad allegations as invalid legal
conclusions.6 Other Black plaintiffs pleaded with greater particularity
that named Whites were similarly situated and treated more favorably.Yet
courts granted dismissal after reasoning that these plaintiffs had not plead-
ed enough to show that Whites were sufficiently comparable-that
Whites were employed in similar capacities with similar job histories-
and that discrimination was plausible. 267 Some plaintiffs pleaded with
great precision that Whites were similarly situated, but courts granted
dismissal nonetheless, holding that these plaintiffs had not pleaded enough
to show that White coworkers were sufficiently comparable and that dis-
crimination was plausible. 268 Remarkably, in some cases, plaintiffs pleaded
that they were terminated and replaced with named Whites, but courts
his legal argument." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,514 (2002))).
266. See Hanks v. Shinseki, No. 3:08-CV-1594-G, 2009 WL 2002917, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Jul. 9, 2009) (identifying the plaintiff's statement as "nothing more than a 'threadbare
recital' ... of the fourth element" of the discrimination claim (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949)).
267. See Deloatch v. Harford Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. CCV-09-3125, 2010 WL
1956804, at *2 (D. Md. May 14, 2010) ("Based on the allegations in the complaint, it
would be speculative to believe that the Board terminated Ms. DeLoatch's employment
for any reason aside from her criminal conviction.").
268. See Keys v. Humana, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-834-S, 2010 WL 2961186, at *3 (WD.
Ky. Jul. 16, 2010); Duncan v. LaSalle (Mgmt.) Grp., Ltd., No. 09-1574, 2010 WL 276242,
at *3 (D. Minn.Jan. 15, 2010).
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characterized these allegations as legal conclusions and insufficient to state
a plausible claim.26 9 Yet other courts found discrimination implausible
when Black plaintiffs pleaded that their employers treated other Blacks in
similar discriminatory fashion2 7 0 or that they were terminated and re-
placed by other Blacks.
Another line of authority, however, applies the final element more
leniently. Some courts accept plaintiffs' allegations that unnamed Whites
are comparable.272 These courts explain that plaintiffs "need not go into
... detail regarding the degree to which those employees outside of
[their] protected class are 'similarly situated: ,273 This question is fact
intensive and best left for a fully developed record at sunrunary judg-
271
ment. Other courts recognize that at the pleading stage, plaintiffs have
not yet conducted discovery on how defendants treated coworkers who
were alleged to be comparators.27 Recognizing that any inference of
discrimination would be weak before discovery, these courts reject the
requirement that plaintiffs must allege with particularity that similarly
situated White employees were treated differently.2 7 6 Others have found
that although plaintiffs have not named White employees who were treat-
277
ed more favorably, that failure is not fatal at the pleading stage.
Overall, the exacting approach is a heightened pleading bar and a
marked change from how courts decided the final element under
Swierkiewicz. Under Conley and Swierkiewicz, federal courts did not re-
quire plaintiffs to name in their complaints particular White employees
269. See Curry v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 3:08cv609, 2010 WL 431692, at *3
(WD.N.C. Feb. 4, 2010); Wilkins v. Bozzuto & Assocs., Inc., No. 09-2581, 2009 WL
4756381, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2009).
270. See Oates v. Jackson Cnty. Sheriff's Office, No. 5:09cv303, 2010 WL 785657, at
*2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 4,2010).
271. See Welch v. Illini Heritage Rehab & Health Care, No. 10-2023, 2010 WL
2364205, at *4 (C.D. Ill. May 18, 2010).
272. See, e.g.,Williams v. Finck & Assocs., No. 2:09CV63MLM, 2010 WL 1992242, at
*6 (E.D. Mo. May 18, 2010); Dunlap v. Denison Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:09cv234, 2010
WL 1189561, at *3 (E.D.Tex. Mar. 25, 2010); Miller v. Eagle Tug Boat Co., No. 09-0401-
CG-B, 2009 WL 4751079, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 8, 2009).
273. Young v. Spectrum Assocs., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-223, 2010 WL 3025232, at *3 (D.
Conn. July 30,2010).
274. Sims v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 2:10-cv-151, 2010 WL 3896428, at *4
(WD. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010).
275. See, e.g., Apau v. Printpack Inc., 722 E Supp. 2d 489, 493-94 (D. Del. 2010).
276. Before discovery, it is difficult to plead facts showing how an employer treated
coworkers more favorably See, e.g., Peterson v. Long Island R.R., No. 10 Civ. 480(ILG),
2010 WL 2671717, at *4 (E.D.N.Y June 30, 2010); Robinson v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Techs. Corp., No. 3:09-CV-00202-LHR-VPC, 2010 WL 1416892, at *4 (D. Nev. Apr. 1,
2010).
277. See, e.g., Keyes v. Wayne State Univ., No. 10-12087, 2010 WL 4054500, at *6
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 5,2010).
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who were treated more favorably.278 Some held that complaints survived
dismissal as long as they supported an inference that people outside of
plaintiffs' protected class were treated differently.27 9 Others concluded that
the proper role of a complaint was simply to give the defendant fair no-
tice of the plaintiff's claims and the grounds upon which they rest. These
courts denied motions to dismiss where plaintiffs had pleaded that ad-
verse action was motivated by racial animus and that at least one
non-Black employee was treated more favorably.280 Finally, others rejected
any per se rule that Blacks were required to plead, when terminated, that
they were replaced by White employees.281
B. Adverse Action
Variance also results from the ways in which courts apply the "ad-
verse action" element. Many courts now require greater precision: they
dismiss claims on grounds that the plaintiffs failed to plead enough facts
to show that they suffered an adverse action. These courts cite
Swierkiewicz even as they grant dismissal. Courts held that plaintiffs failed
to plausibly plead cognizable adverse actions when grievances stemmed
2'2841 2. from disparate reprimands,283 evaluations, promotions, 2 job responsibil-
278. See, e.g., Fortes v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., No. 06-0878, 2006 WL 3043108, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2006); Harold v. Barnhart, 450 F Supp. 2d 544, 561 (E.D. Pa. 2006);
Esukpa v.John Eagle Sports City Toyota, No. 3:05-CV-2196-M, 2006 WL 2371329, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2006) ("Though plaintiff does not explicitly set forth facts establishing
that others outside the protected class were treated more favorably, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has met his pleading requirement as described in Swierkiewicz.").
279. See, e.g., Fortes, 2006 WL 3043108, at *4; Harold, 450 F Supp. 2d at 561; Robins
v. Moore, No. Civ.A. 4:05CV104, 2006 WL 1520573, at *5 (E.D. Va. May 31, 2006);
Mitchell v. N.J. Lottery, No. 04-486 (MLC), 2006 WL 1344092, at *5 (D.N.J. May 15,
2006).
280. See Cobb v. Marshall, 481 E Supp. 2d 1248, 1257 (M.D. Ala. 2007); Prophete v.
Ed Mitchell, Inc., No. 3:05-cv912(WWE), 2006 WL 1668024, at *1 (D. Conn. June 15,
2006); Branchedor v. 2900 Twelfth St. N., LLC, No. 2:05-cv-398-FtM-99SPC, 2006 WL
2092261, at *1 (M.D. FlaJuly 26, 2006).
281. See Gantt v. City of Forsyth, No. 5:06-CV-400(WDO), 2007 WL 842148, at *1
(M.D. Ga. Mar. 16,2007).
282. See Russell v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., No. 4:09cv1695 TCM, 2010
WL 1462086, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13, 2010); Hardeman v. United States, 682 F Supp. 2d
947, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2010); Hutchinson v. Holder, 668 E Supp. 2d 201, 215 (D.D.C. 2009);
Floyd v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. RDB-09-0735, 2009 WL 3614830, at *7 (D.
Md. Oct. 27,2009).
283. Easter v. Geithner, No. 1:10 CV 48, 201 OWL 4628564, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
18,2010).
284. Wormack v. Shinseki, No. 2:09-cv-916, 2010 WL 4052189, at *5 (WD. Pa. Oct.
14,2010).
285. Floyd, 2009 WL 3614830, at *6.
48 [VOL. 17:1
Beyond Common Sense
2186 28 28'ities, dismissals from workm denials of training, and lost supervisory
opportunities and discretionary bonuses.2 89
Other courts apply the adverse action element more leniently, ex-
plaining that many of the above-listed job harms may ultimately be
insufficient to show discrimination at summary judgment. 2 90 Nonetheless,
these harms are not per se insufficient at the pleading stage. 9 ' The rele-
vant inquiry instead turns on context and whether the harm had tangible,
adverse effects on plaintiffs' employment.
Here, too, the more exacting approach is a heightened pleading bar
that departs from prior jurisprudence. Previously, courts often refused to
293
evaluate the substance of the adverse action at the pleading stage.
Courts thought this inquiry best left for summary judgment after discov-
291
ery. Indeed, deciding the issue on the pleadings was thought contrary
286. Mangun v. United Parcel Servs., No. 3:09-CV-385-D, 2009 WL 4823018, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009).
287. Collins v.Vaughan Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 10-0161-CG-M, 2010 WL 3724771, at
*5 (S.D.Ala.Aug. 24, 2010).
288. Holland v. Pilot Travel Ctr., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-262(CAR), 2010 WL 2732047,
at *5 (M.D. Ga. Jul. 8, 2010) ("Plaintiff is left with his assertion that Defendant failed to
train him in his new position. But Plaintiff fails to allege that any denial of training by
Defendant had a material effect on the terms or conditions of his employment.").
289. Floyd, 2009 WL 3614830, at *6.
290. See Apau v. Printpack Inc., 722 E Supp. 2d 489, 493 (D. Del. 2010); Law v.Auto-
zone Stores, Inc., No. 4:09CV00017, 2009 WL 4349165, at *2 (WD.Va. Nov. 25, 2009)
("[The employer] cites a string of cases for the proposition that a written reprimand is
insufficient as a matter of law to constitute an adverse employment action. This interpreta-
tion of the relevant case law is mistaken. The precedent clarifies that a reprimand is
neither automatically sufficient nor per se insufficient to meet that element of the claim.").
291. See Law, 2009 WL 4349165, at *2.
292. See Moore v. Contra Costa Coll. Dist., No. C 09-4781 MEJ, 201OWL 3385037,
at *4 (N.D. Cal.Aug. 26, 2010); Law, 2009 WL 4349165, at *2.
293. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 06 C 0308, 2007 WL 1030431,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2007) ("It is worth mentioning that every Seventh Circuit case to
which the Defendant cited for an example of what constitutes a legally insufficient ad-
verse employment action was an appeal from a summary judgment decision. That is
because a district court will not generally inquire into the substance of the alleged adverse
employment action on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)."); Fortes v. Boy-
ertown Area Sch. Dist., No. 06-0878, 2006 WL 3043108, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2006)
("Given the procedural posture of this case, Plaintiff's allegations support an inference of
disparate treatment affecting the 'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment' on the basis of race." (quoting Storey v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 390 E3d 760,
764 (3d Cir. 2004))); Martin v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 05-C-0209, 2006 WL 897751,
at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2006) ("Summary judgment is the better vehicle for attacking
the sufficiency of factual allegations related to adverse actions. After all, [Plaintifi] has not
asserted facts in his complaint that would entirely bar recovery").
294. See Buford v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:06-CV-3089-TWT, 2007 WL 1341115,
*4-5 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 30, 2007) ("Plaintiff Buford may be able to offer evidence which
would allow a jury to conclude that a reasonable employee in his position would find the
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to the rule that adversity is determined by examining the circumstances
of each particular case.295
C. Nondiscriminatory Justifications
Less often, courts have granted dismissal on the grounds that plain-
tiffs had failed to show that the defendant's plausible nondiscriminatory
justifications were pretextual.96 Some courts, however, did hold that the
plaintiffs' failure to plead facts disproving pretext rendered their claims
implausible Other courts weighed the employer's nondiscriminatory
justifications against the inference of discrimination, ultimately conclud-
ing that plaintiffs had stated plausible claims.
Most courts, though, hold that considering pretext and weighing al-
leged nondiscriminatory justifications are not allowed at the pleading
stage because plaintiffs are not yet required to anticipate and refute non-
discriminatory reasons for adverse action at that stage. Instead,
defendants must advance those justifications at summary judgment, and
only then must plaintiffs refute them.3 00 That some jurists now weigh
nondiscriminatory reasons at the pleading stage demonstrates that the
standards that once governed summary judgment have shifted to the
1 d. 301pleading stage.
reassignment ... to be a materially adverse employment action."); Kriesch v. Johanns 468
E Supp. 2d 183, 189 (D.D.C. 2007); Martin, 2006WL 897751, at *3.
295. See Buford, 2007 WL 1341115, at *4-5.
296. See Sojourner v. Cherry, No. 1:09-CV-3460-TWT, 2010 WL 3516830, at *2
(N.D. Ga.Aug. 31, 2010) ("[I]t is necessary for a plaintiff to plead sufficient factual matter
to show that [a defendant] acted not for a legitimate, non-pretextual reason, but for the
purpose of discriminating on account of race .... ") (internal quotation marks omitted);
Floyd v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. RDB-09-0735, 2009 WL 3614830, at *7 (D.
Md. Oct. 27, 2009) ("Finally, even if [Plaintiff] could establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, Defendant has cited legitimate, nondiscriminatory justifications for its
decision to suspend [Plaintiff] on two occasions and to ultimately remove her from her
position .... ").
297. See Welch v. Illini Heritage Rehab & Health Care, No. 10-2023, 2010 WL
2364205, at *5 (C.D. Ill. May 18, 2010); Mitchell v. Project Renewal, No. 09
Civ.1958(CM), 2010 WL 481348, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2010); Floyd, 2009WL 3614830,
at *7.
298. See Mayale-Eke v. Merrill Lynch, 754 F Supp. 2d 372, 382-83 (DR.I. 2010).
299. See Keyes v. Wayne State Univ., No. 10-12087, 2010 WL 4054500, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 5, 2010); Angrand v. Paragon Vill., No. 09-1118 (FLW), 2010 WL 1644132, at
*4 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2010); Washington v. Univ. of Ill. at Chicago, No. 09 C 5691, 2010 WL
1417000, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2010); Nyame v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., No. 08 Civ.
9656(DAB), 2010 WL 1379794, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010).
300. See Keyes, 2010 WL 4054500, at *6; Angrand, 2010 WL 1644132, at *4;
Washington, 201 OWL 1417000, at *4.
301. See supra Part III.
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D. Racial Harassment
Most courts deny motions to dismiss claims of racial harassment
when plaintiffs plead overt racial animus. As predicted by social psycho-
logical research, however, many courts grant motions to dismiss when
plaintiffs complain of more subtle forms of harassment.
Many jurists now evaluate claims of racial harassment more rigor-
ously Many grant dismissal on grounds that harassment was not
sufficiently severe or pervasive, even though plaintiffs complained of racial
intolerance in the workplace.302 For example, courts granted dismissal
where plaintiffs complained about music that was derogatory toward
Blacks'03 and comments about racial stereotypes. 04 These courts often
determine that plaintiffs have not pleaded enough to show that harass-
ment was severe or pervasive or that workplaces had become permeated
with racial animus.os Some characterize harassment as merely workplace
friction or blame the plaintiff for strife in the workplace.31' Others char-
acterize plaintiffs' allegations of harassment as legal conclusions. 07 When
plaintiffs plead facts suggesting overt racial animus, however, most courts
deem claims of harassment sufficiently plausible:300 these courts denied
motions to dismiss and found that plaintiffs had provided defendants with
fair notice of their claims.309
302. See, e.g., Everett v. Liberty Healthcare Sys., LLC, No. 09-0683, 2009 WL
4456290, at *3 (WD. La. Dec. 1, 2009); Mock v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. DKC 09-
1370, 2009 WL 3297243, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 8, 2009); Stewart v. Moccasin Bend Mental
Hosp., No. 1:07-cv-305, 2009 WL 2913953, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2009); Hurth v.
Bradman Lake Grp. Ltd., No. 3:08 CV 370-MR-DSC, 2009 WL 2497993, at *9
(WD.N.C. Aug. 14, 2009); Dorsey v. Ga. Dep't of State Rd. & Tollway Auth. SRTA, No.
1:09-CV- 1 182-TWT, 2009 WL 2477565, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2009).
303. See Hurth, 2009 WL 2497993, at *9.
304. See Dorsey, 2009 WL 2477565, at *7.
305. See Collins v. Vaughan Reg'I Med. Ctr., No. 10-0161-CG-M, 2010 WL
3724771, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 2010); Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 E Supp. 2d 64, 93-94
(D.D.C. 2009).
306. See Richardson v. Suffolk Bus Corp., No. 09-CV-3586 (JFB)(ARL), 2010 WL
2606266, at *9 (E.D.N.Y June 22, 2010); Springs v. Mayer Brown, LLP, No. 3:09cv352,
2010 WL 2347946, at *5 (WD.N.C.June 9,2010); Cheatam v. Blanda, No. 1:08-CV-299,
2010 WL 2209217, at *4 (E.D. Tex.Apr. 23, 2010); Floyd v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
No. RDB-09-0735, 2009 WL 3614830, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 2009).
307. See Doe v. Sizewise Rentals, LLC, No.09-3409 (JLL), 2010 WL 4861138, at *6
(D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2010); Blackston v. N.J. Transit Corp., No. 10-878, 2010 WL 4259603, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27,2010); Greater Indianapolis Chapter of the NAACP v. Ballard, 721 F.
Supp. 2d 925, 940 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
308. See Norrnan v. Rolling Hills Hosp., LLC, No. 3:10-0500, 2010 WL 2901881, at
*4 (M.D.Tenn. July 22, 2010); Williams v. Finck & Assocs., No. 2:09CV63MLM, 2010 WL
1992242, at *4 (E.D. Mo. May 18, 2010); Robinson v. Westinghouse Air Brake Techs.
Corp., No. 3:09-CV-00202-LHR-VPC, 2010 WL 1416892, at *4 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 2010).
309. See, e.g., Colquitt v. Xerox Corp., No. 05-CV-6405, 2010 WL 3943734, at *4
(WD.N.Y Oct. 7,2010).
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Some jurists believe that claims of harassment withstand dismissal
even where harassment is less overt. Some hold that plaintiffs need only
plead that they faced harassment that a reasonable employee would find
had altered the conditions of employment for the worse and caution
3101
against setting the bar too high at the pleading stage. Rather than re-
quiring plaintiffs to prove their case at the pleading stage, some courts
hold that plaintiffs survive dismissal if they alleged facts that could be pro-
bative of a discriminatory hostile work environment.' These courts deny
312
motions to dismiss even when racial harassment is less overt.
Here again, we see a shift in the way courts adjudicate claims at the
pleading stage. Under Conley, most jurists held that plaintiffs were not
required to plead specific facts to set forth a clear case of harassment;
dismissal should only be granted if it appeared beyond doubt that plain-
tiffs could prove no set of facts that supported their claims of racial
harassment. 3 14 In close cases-those involving less overt forms of harass-
ment-courts evaluated the totality of the circumstances, read complaints
in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, and often refused to deem allega-
tions insufficient to state a claim of racial harassment.m Courts gave
plaintiffs every benefit of the doubt, even where plaintiffs neglected to
plead that they had suffered harassment specifically based on race. 6 This
lenient application of Rule 8(a) is inconsistent with the more exacting
interpretation of Iqbal.
E. Black Pro Se Plaintifs
The Article now turns to Black pro se plaintiffs' claims and the in-
creased dismissal of those claims. Shortly after Twoibly, in Erickson v.
Pardus, the Court instructed that pro se complaints must be liberally con-
310. See, e.g., Platt v. Univ. of Mich., No. 2:09-CV-10886, 2010 WL 1286487, at *15
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2010).
311. See Winston v. Clough, 712 E Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2010); Robinson, 2010 WL
1416892, at *4.
312. See Drew v. Plaza Constr. Corp., 688 F. Supp. 2d 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
313. See, e.g., Peterson v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1111
(E.D. Cal. 2006).
314. See e.g., Dunn v.Wash. Corr. Inst., No. 05-4145-ILRL-SS, 2006 WL 3791976, at
*2 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2006); Kilpatrick-Ray v. Alminde, No. 06-1889, 2006 WL 3420300,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2006).
315. See Kriesch v.Johanns, 468 F Supp. 2d 183, 188 (D.D.C. 2007); Ahanotu v. Mass.
Tpk. Auth., 466 F Supp. 2d 378, 394 (D. Mass. 2006); Garrett v. U.S. Dep't ofVeterans
Affairs, No. 05 CV 1164 JLL, 2006 WL 2627962, at *6 (D.N.J. Sep. 13, 2006); Antwine v.
Daiiler-Chrysler Servs. of N. Am. LLC, No. 05-2426-CM, 2006 WL 1083993, at *2 (D.
Kan. Apr. 24, 2006);Williams v. Chertoff, No. Civ. 05-211(RCL), 2005 WL 3200794, at *3
(D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2005).
316. See Satchel v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., No. 8:05-CV-2239-T-24 TBM,
2006 WL 2474261, at *4 (M.D. Fla.Aug. 25, 2006).
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strued and held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by law-
317
yers. Nevertheless, Iqbal has had a significant effect on unrepresented
Black plaintiffs because, like other pro se plaintiffs, they tend to assert
claims in a more broad, general fashion than represented parties; on
balance, courts tend to characterize many more of their allegations as
legal conclusions . Study 2 demonstrates that courts have increasingly
dismissed claims of discrimination brought by Black pro se plaintiffs post-
Iqbal. The grant rate doubled from 32.0% under Conley to 67.3% under
Iqbal, reflecting that it is 2.10 times more likely that Black pro se plaintiffs'
claims will be dismissed. Federal courts seem to treat Erickson as a "paper
rule," one that does not accurately describe or predict judicial behavior.
This disparity, an urgent and systemic problem for federal courts,
warrants global review.32 0 Many pro se plaintiffs rely on form complaints
made available to them by federal courts, but it appears that those forms
have not been updated to reflect the heightened pleading requirements
now employed by many courts when scrutinizing complaints. Incomplete
instructions may lull pro se plaintiffs into pleading claims in a more gen-
eral fashion than is advisable under current federal jurisprudence.32 1 For
example, form complaints often instruct pro se plaintiffs to "state ... as
briefly and clearly as possible, the essential facts of your claim. Describe
specifically the conduct that you believe is discriminatory and describe
how each defendant is involved in the conduct."3 22 This language may
lead those who know nothing of Title VII's substantive standards and the
pleading requirements under Iqbal to articulate claims without sufficient
precision. For example, the forms neither advise pro se plaintiffs that
courts will screen their pleadings for facts setting forth a prima facie case
317. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
318. See, e.g., Carroll-Hall v. Arc of Balt., No. RDB-10-00873, 2010 WL 3781887, at
*4 (D. Md. Sep. 22, 2010); Holland v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-262 (CAR),
2010 WL 2732047, at *5 (M.D. Ga. July 8, 2010); Curry v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No.
3:08cv609, 2010 WL 431692, at *3 (WD.N.C. Feb. 4, 2010); Enadeghe v. Ryla Teleserv-
ices, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-3551-TWT, 2010 WL 481210, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2010);
Perrymond v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 1:09-CV-1936-TWT, 2010 WL 987218, at
*11 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2010); Stewart v. Moccasin Bend Mental Hosp., No. 1:07-cv-305,
2009 WL 2913953, at *6 (E.D.Tenn. Sep. 8,2009).
319. See Llewellyn, supra note 215, at 447-48.
320. Unfortunately, the FJC's recent study on Iqbal's effects excluded all pro se cases,
presuming that federal courts would not apply a heightened pleading standard against pro
se plaintiffs given their obligation to construe these complaints liberally. CECIL ET AL.,
supra note 214, at 6. Study 2 suggests that by excluding pro se cases, the FJC's report may
have inadvertently underreported Iqbal's effect overall.
321. See Mock v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. DKC 09-1370, 2009 WL 3297243, at
*4 (D. Md. Oct. 8, 2009); Carroll-Hall, 2010 WL 3781887, at *4; Clyburn v. LGC Assocs.,
No. 4:1OCV191-DJS, 2010 WL 2518467, at *3 (E.D. Mo.June 14, 2010).
322. Clyburn, 201 OWL 2518467, at *2 (citing Title VII Employment Discrimination
Complaint, available at http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/moed-0035.pdf
(last visited Aug. 28, 2011) (standard complaint form for the Eastern District of Missouri)).
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of discrimination, nor encourage pro se plaintiffs to plead that similarly
situated comparators were treated differently.
Courts may also employ heuristics when evaluating the plausibility
of pro se claims by inferring that pro se claims are less plausible than
counseled claims. That a plaintiff is unrepresented may send a subtle cue
about the likely merit of his or her claims. In addition, the powerful cul-
tural stereotypes for the subgroup of Blacks who are poor and cannot
afford counsel may subtly affect analysis of these pro se plaintiffs' claims.32
In sum, Iqbal has resulted in marked legal uncertainty and altered
how federal district courts decide Black plaintiffs' claims of discrimination
at the pleading stage. Many courts now screen such complaints more rig-
orously than in the past, importing into the pleading stage standards once
applicable only at summary judgment.
VI. A ONCE-INVISIBLE PROBLEM Now IN VIEW
Some commentators contend that Iqbal makes no new law under
Rule 8, poses no issues of access to justice, and simply makes explicit
what courts have done all along. Iqbal is business as usual: old wine in a
new bottle, they say.32 4 Others contend that it is too soon to tell whether
Iqbal is having any effect on the adjudication of claims. 325 Still others have
been sharply critical of the Supreme Court's decision, contending that
under Iqbal federal courts may well screen out a large percentage of civil
rights litigation.
Whether federal courts have fashioned a heightened pleading re-
gime under Iqbal is an empirical question: we must move past rhetoric
and observe Iqbal's actual effects on the ground in particular categories of
cases.327 This Article has focused narrowly on the question of how Iqbal
has affected Black plaintiffs' claims of race discrimination in the work-
place. From this vantage point, it becomes clear that federal courts have
applied Iqbal as if it called for a new pleading regime-one that, in
323. See Cuddy & Fiske, supra note 126, at 638.
324. See, e.g., Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans'Access to Courts?, supra note 10;
Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading with Congress to Resist the Urge to Overrule Twonbly and
Iqbal, 109 MicH. L. REv. 415, 428 (2010).
325. See, e.g., Noll, supra note 11, at 147 ("Here, as elsewhere, the verdict is still
out.").
326. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REv. 65, 85-106 (2010); Miller, supra note 12, at 20; Schneider, supra note 12, at
532-36; Thomas, supra note 12, at 18.
327. See Cohen, supra note 13, at 824 ("Fundamentally there are only two significant
questions in the field of law. One is,'How do courts actually decide cases of a given kind?'
The other is, 'How ought they to decide cases of a given kind?'"); Jf KAPLAN, supra note
13, at 36.
practice, is a heightened pleading bar.328 A first wave of empirical schol-
arship, conducted most notably by Professor Hatamyar, has shown that
federal courts have begun applying Iqbal in ways that have increased
dismissals across many federal cases. 329 By systematically studying and
examining these narrow questions in light of social psychological re-
search, this Article demonstrates that Iqbal has had an even greater effect
than other studies suggested. The problem is now in view.
Social psychological research on aversive bias suggested this would
come to pass. By shifting from a notice-pleading rule to a plausibility
pleading standard, unconscious stereotypes and implicit associations are
more likely to affect decision making and result in decisions biased to-
ward dismissal. Iqbal explicitly requires federal district judges to draw on
their "common sense" in determining the plausibility of plaintiffs' claims,
without the benefit of concrete evidence.
Research on lay theories of racism also suggested that courts would
increasingly dismiss claims of subtle discrimination.330 A widely held folk
theory among majority group members is that discrimination is no long-
er a problem for minority group members in American society.
Moreover, many hold the lay theory that racism is a psychopathology-
that racists act in blatant and overt ways.33 Meanwhile, many Blacks have
a more expansive view of prejudice as encompassing behaviors both overt
and subtle.
This Article finds that judges are no exception. Empirical analysis
demonstrates that courts have increasingly dismissed claims of discrimina-
tion, especially when prejudice appeared less overt,332 and that White
judges are more likely to grant dismissal under Iqbal than Black judges.
With the problem in view, it becomes evident that Iqbal has resulted
in epistenic tension in the law, with philosophical and practical implica-
tions. First, the priority placed by the Court on common sense as the
gauge of legal validity was critiqued by John Stuart Mill as the a priori
328. That is, the basic operations that federal district courts now perform when re-
viewing and evaluating plaintiffs' claims of discrimination have changed, which has
resulted in a heightened pleading bar. To understand what Iqbal means in any meaningful
sense, we must look not merely to the Supreme Court's opinion itself (or what commen-
tators say about it), but to the different operations that federal courts actually perform in
light of lqbal and their ultimate effect. See supra Part IVA.
329. Hatanyar, supra note 14; see also Hannon, supra note 10; Seiner, supra note 214.
330. See supra Part II.B.
331. See supra Part II.B.
332. This finding is consistent with a recent empirical study, which found that many
courts tend not to view microaggressions and subtle forms of discrimination-alleged
among some Black plaintiffs' claims-as cognizable under Title VII. Eden B. King et al.,
Discrimination in the 21st Century:Are Science and the Law Aligned?, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 54, 69 (2011) ("[Olur findings seem to indicate a disconnect between the experi-
ences of targets of discrimination and the legal system in which recourse is sought.").
333. See Study 3 supra Part IV.B.
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fallacy: "A large proportion of all the errors committed in the investiga-
tion of the laws of nature, have arisen from the assumption that the most
familiar explanation or hypothesis must be the truest.""' Law driven by
folk theories that have been scientifically disproven is indefensible.' Iqbal
presumes that unchecked common sense can be applied without the sub-
tle pull of stereotypes and without biased outcomes, a presumption that
science has long since disproven, particularly in the discrimination con-
text. Further, Iqbal assumes incorrectly that what many take for granted as
"common sense"-the dominant folk theory of race relations in Ameri-
can society-is accurate. Yet common beliefs regarding concepts such as
prejudice, race, and discrimination has evolved over time for better or
worse, reflecting change in American society. 3 7 Today, there is a marked
duality between many Americans' characterization of prejudice as blatant
and the science demonstrating that manifestations of prejudice have be-
come increasingly subtle.338
334. JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF Locic: RATiOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIvE 526 (8th
ed. 1904). Social and cognitive psychologists have examined this fallacy as the availability
heuristic and simulation heuristic using Tversky and Kahnenan's heuristics and biases
framework. See, e.g., NISBETT & Ross, supra note 161, at 17-42; Gideon Keren & Karl H.
Teigen, Yet Another Look at the Heuristics and Biases Approach, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 89, 97 (Derek J. Koebler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2007).
335. See BENJAMIN N. CARDozO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw 73 (1924); LEITER, supra
note 16, at 31 ("[T]raditional philosophical problems are ... insoluble by the a priori, arm-
chair methods of the philosopher, and . .. require, instead, embedding in (or replacement
by) suitable empirical theories."); POSNER, supra note 243, at 230-37; WV QuINE, Natural-
ism; or, Living Within One's Means, in QUINTESSENCE: BASIC READINGS FROM THE
PHILOSOPHY OF WV QuINE 275 (Robert F Gibson, Jr. ed., 1969); Christine Jolls & Cass
Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 972 (2006) ("[l]n formulating and
interpreting legal rules, legislatures and courts should pay close attention to the best avail-
able evidence about people's actual behavior-an approach ... term[ed] 'behavioral
realism.' "); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 15, at 1000.
336. See Henri Tajfel, Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL 1,
21-22 (1982) ("One of the principal features ... of intergroup behavior and attitudes [is]
the tendency shown by members of an ingroup to consider members of outgroups in a
relatively uniform manner, as 'undifferentiated items in a unified social category' . . . Con-
ceptions of outgroups are generated in their social and historical contexts and then
transmitted to individual members of groups and widely shared . (quoting TAJFEL,
supra note 33, at 243)).
337. Consider how common beliefs about members of stereotyped groups have
changed across time. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1856) ("[Blacks are]
a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who ... ha[ve] no rights or privileges .... ");
MILL, supra note 334, at 550 ("What, for example, is to be thought of all the 'conunon
sense' maxims for which the following may serve as the universal formula .... [Nlegroes
have never been as civilized as [W]hites sometimes are, therefore it is impossible they
should be so."); VANDER ZANDEN, supra note 42, at 45, 53-54 ("The notion of racial and
ethnic superiority and inferiority has had wide currency in the modern age .... Accord-
ing to a popular superstition, the offspring of interracial unions inherit most of the bad
and few of the good qualities of the parental stocks.").
338. See supra Part II.
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On the practical side, the consequences if Iqbal's pleading standards
go uncorrected will be profound for civil rights litigation and the scope
of federal nondiscrimination law. Although prejudice persists in American
society, federal civil rights law may chiefly reach overt forms of discrimi-
nation. Since civil rights law will remedy subtle prejudice only
unpredictably, these victims will have no "real right" to be free from sub-
tle prejudice.3' And with no "real right," as Wesley Hohfeld long ago
observed, majority group members would have the privilege to discrimi-
nate against them in subtle forms. 340 Civil rights law would fail to protect
the members of stigmatized groups who most need legal protection
against modern forms of prejudice.
The problem is not that Iqbal calls for federal courts to draw on
common sense or past experience. As Justice Holmes famously said,"The
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.",3 ' This Article
does not challenge the pragmatic style of adjudication, which often draws
on common sense, experience, and reflection."' The problem is that lqbal
requires judges to draw on their common sense at the very inception of
litigation, before evidence has been presented to them. This regime nec-
essarily requires judges to act with minimal foresight and deliberation,
344based upon intuitions and presuppositions.
339. See Llewellyn, supra note 215, at 447-49.
340. WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING 36-40 (1919). Hohfeld articulated a theory ofjural relations that likened the
scenario where A has "no right" to stop B from causing harm to A with the scenario
where B has the "privilege" to cause A harm. For example, if A has "no right" to stop B
from engaging in particular conduct, then B can engage in that activity without legal
interference from A. In that sense, B has the "privilege" to perform this conduct (even if
B's conduct inflicts harm on A that is not legally cognizable). See J.M. Balkin, The Holfeld-
ian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119, 1129 (1990) ("Hohfeld's basic
idea [is] that a legal right is a privilege to inflict harm that is either not legally cognizable
or is otherwise without legal remedy.").
341. Further, since American society tolerates as "natural" overt discrimination against
some stigmatized groups-for example, in the form of recent anti-immigrant ordinanc-
es-some overt discrimination may also remain under- or un-enforced. This issue
warrants empirical study another day.
342. O.W HOLMES,JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
343. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The judgment Intuitive: The Function of the Hunch in
judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 279 (1929);JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 102-07 (1930).
344. See FRANK, supra, note 343, at 147 ("[A]mong the most important objects which
would be subject to [the judge's] scrutiny as a psychologist would be his own personality
so that he might become keenly aware of his own prejudices, biases, antipathies, and the
like, not only in connection with attitudes political, economic, moral but with respect to
more minute and less easily discoverable preferences and disinclinations."); PosNER, supra
note 243, at 67 ("Preconceptions play a role in rational thought .... [P]reconceptions
impound information, though it is not always accurate.").
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Without evidence to evaluate, preconceptions too strongly affect the
result.4 Initial intuitions form but one part of judicial decision making.
From judicial experience, we generate working hypotheses that must be
further tested and evaluated.346 Although common sense, a hunch, may
suggest that no discrimination occurred in a case, social psychology shows
that these hypotheses must be evaluated for their accuracy to avoid im-
plicit stereotypes and associations.3" This evaluation requires evidence that
courts do not possess at the pleading stage.The consequence is a heuristic
known as the confirmation bias,3 4 the tendency to over-rely on one's
initial hunch or hypothesis. Summary judgment is the proper vehicle
for deliberating with evidence, for testing initial hunches and hypotheses
against evidence.
Social psychological research, particularly on the MODE model of
mental processing, confirms that jurists should not be forced to screen
complaints based upon their preconceptions. MODE stands for
"motivation and opportunity as determinants of whether the attitude-to-
behavior process is primarily spontaneous or deliberate."35' Research
shows that implicit associations exert more influence on spontaneous
than deliberative processes. Spontaneous processes involve, for example,
automatic behavior and judgment toward people of color that is subtly
influenced by stereotypes and automatic associations about race. In con-
trast, deliberative processes are more mindful and require individuated
evaluation of people of color, which may result in unbiased judgments.3
Deliberative processing requires effort and reflection: people must be mo-
345. See NiSBETT & Ross, supra note 161, at 67 ("[P]rior theories, schemas, perceptu-
al and problem solving sets, and other preconceptions can powerfully influence subjects'
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. The impact of preconceptions is one of the better
demonstrated findings of twentieth-century psychology .... ").
346. See John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17,23-24 (1924).
347. See Craig R. M. McKenzie, Hypothesis Testing and Evaluation, in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 200 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey
eds., 2007).
348. Id. at 203.
349. See NISBETT, supra note 161, at 38 ("Schemas are apt to be overused and misap-
plied, particularly to the social sphere, and they are apt to be used when other, less rapid
and intuitive methods of judgment would fully merit the additional time and effort re-
quired."); McKenzie, supra note 347, at 204 ("If one were to attempt to identify a single
problematic aspect of human reasoning that deserves attention above all others, the con-
firmation bias would have to be among the candidates for consideration .. ,").
350. See Fazio & Olson, supra note 156, at 301 (describing MODE model of pro-
cessing, which differentiates deliberate processes from more spontaneous forms of
thinking).
351. Id.; see also B. Keith Payne & Brandon D. Stewart, Automatic and Controlled Com-
ponents of Social Cognition: A Process Dissociation Approach, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
UNcoNscIous: THE AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES 293, 296-309 (John A.
Bargh ed., 2007).
352. See Fazio & Olson, supra note 156, at 301-02.
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tivated to engage in it. If not, their automatic and implicit associations
may give rise to bias. Opportunity, time, and resources (both cognitive
31
and evidentiary) are necessary to deliberate.35 In short, jurists can over-
ride their implicit associations when they have both the appropriate
evidence before them and the motivation to reflect carefully on infor-
mation that differentiates one individual from others.
The United States Supreme Court surely did not intend to curb
civil rights enforcement by Blacks. Rather, the Iqbal Court drew on an
unsound theory of judgment: the assumption that courts could apply the
plausibility standard in a deductive and color-blind manner. The Court
neglected science demonstrating that judgment and decision making are
regularly influenced by unconscious bias and implicit stereotypes and as-
sociations about stigmatized groups. Even so, the Iqbal Court did not call
for a heightened pleading bar, nor did it cast doubt on the validity of
Rule 8(a)(2).
The locus of the problem, therefore, is not merely the Court's plia-
ble language in Iqbal, but how federal courts have elaborated on and
applied that language. In practice, many courts are reconstructing Iqbal as
if it called for a heightened pleading bar. These courts begin from an er-
roneous premise. If the Supreme Court had intended to fashion a
heightened pleading bar, given the separation-of-powers issues implicated,
surely it would have set forth that intent plainly and clearly. The broad
reinterpretation of Iqbal runs afoul of the Rules Enabling Act, and that
interpretation is plainly invalid. The Supreme Court has twice advised
that heightened pleading bars cannot be imposed by judicial interpreta-
tion 3 54
The dilemma calls for a sense of judicial craft. Federal courts must
re-assess their own actions in light of the growing evidence that the
dominant interpretation of Iqbal has increased the dismissal rate for claims
by members of stereotyped groups. Courts must recall that jurisprudence
is a craft that must be consistent with reasonable regularity in the law,
35,
with leeway afforded within precedent, doctrine, and patterns of cases.
From this perspective, the rigorous construction of Iqbal must be rejected
as a heightened pleading standard that is contrary to the Rules Enabling
Act. The Rules Enabling Act requires a formal, federal civil rule-making
process with input from the Judicial Conference and the Advisory
Committee. These bodies would surely have vetoed a heightened plead-
ing bar having a disparate effect on members of stereotyped groups.
353. See id.
354. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Leatherman v.
Tarrant Cnty Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
355. See LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 22, at 70-71, 172-77; LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADiTiON, supra note 22, at 213-35; POSNER, supra note 243, at 230-
65.
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Instead of a rigorous reconstruction of Iqbal, courts should interpret
Iqbal more in line with Rule 8(a)(2) and the Rules Enabling Act. While
Conley has been retired, Rule 8(a)'s "short and plain statement" rule has
not. Indeed, the Supreme Court very recently issued Skinner v. Switzer,
which is consistent with a more narrow interpretation of Iqbal. In that
case, the Court ruled that the question under Rule 8(a) is not whether
plaintiffs will ultimately prevail on their claims, but is instead whether com-
plaints are sufficient to cross the federal court's minimal pleading thresh-
threshold . This interpretation may avert the effect of stereotypes and
implicit bias on judicial decision making at the pleading stage. Federal
courts have the means, opportunity, and leeway consistent with a sense of
judicial craft, to construe Iqbal as not requiring federal courts to rigorous-
ly screen complaints for their meritoriousness.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that, in practice, many courts are applying a
heightened pleading bar, resulting in increased dismissals of Black plain-
tiffs' claims of race discrimination. In many ways, this Article is but the
opening chapter, the first step in a wider discussion of Iqbal's effect on
Black plaintiffs' claims and on the claims of members of other stereotyped
groups. It is likely that the same natural psychological processes that dis-
advantage Blacks are operating against other stereotyped groups at the
pleading stage. Many Americans hold negative implicit associations about
others with different social identities, including race, gender, religion, na-
tional origin, age, class, disability, sexual orientation, and immigration
status. It is unclear how Iqbal has affected dismissals for members of other
stereotyped groups. Both qualitative and quantitative research is warrant-
ed to examine Iqbal's effect in those particularized situations as well. The
Federal Judicial Center and the Judicial Conference's Advisory Commit-
tee on Civil Rules are encouraged to investigate these empirical
questions along with other scholars interested in the connection between
social psychological phenomena and law.
Iqbal's pleading standard seems neutral and benign when examined
void of context.Yet when courts are tasked with making subjective evalu-
356. 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011).
357. Also consistent with this view is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Swanson v.
CitiBank. 614 E3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010). There, in making sense of Twombly and Iqbal, the
Seventh Circuit explained that "a basic objective of the rules is to avoid cases turning on
technicalities and to require that the pleading discharge the function of giving the oppos-
ing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the pleading's claim and a
general indication of the type of litigation that is involved." Id. at 404 (quoting 5 WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 36, § 1215). As in Switzer, Sivanson held that the question is not
whether race discrimination did happen, but whether it could have happened in light of the
allegations. Id.
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ations about the merits of claims based on common sense and at the in-
ception of litigation without any evidence, natural psychological processes
likely result in bias. The problem is especially pronounced when members
of stigmatized groups bring claims of discrimination. This issue is pro-
found and should not remain obscured. How we resolve this problem will
determine whether all people are afforded authentic and equal access to
the courts.

